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Abstract
According to Moore’s law, technology scaling is continuously providing smaller and faster devices.
These scaled devices are, however, becoming increasingly susceptible to in-field hardware failures
from sources such as high-energy particle strikes (or soft-errors). This reliability threat is expected
to affect a broad computing market motivating the need for very low cost resiliency solutions.
Software anomaly based hardware error detection has emerged as an effective low cost solution.
A small fraction of hardware errors, however, escape these anomaly detectors and produce Silent
Data Corruptions (or SDCs). Eliminating or significantly lowering the user-visible SDC rate is
crucial for software-driven reliability solutions to become practically successful. The goal of this
thesis, therefore, is to provide programmers and system designers with tools and techniques to
evaluate software-driven resiliency solutions, identify application locations that are susceptible to
producing SDCs, and provide application-centric SDC mitigation techniques to achieve significantly
lower SDC rates for a given performance (and/or power) budget with low effort.
The first part of this thesis presents an approach called Relyzer that addresses the challenges in
identifying virtually all application locations that are susceptible to producing SDCs when subjected
to soft errors. Instead of performing expensive error injections on all possible application-level error
sites, which is impractical, Relyzer carefully picks a small set of representatives called pilots. It
employs novel error site pruning techniques to reduce the number of detailed error injections. The
key insight is to show equivalence between application-level error sites, as apposed to only predicting
their outcomes. Relyzer uses program structure and dynamic information to show equivalence
between error sites from different dynamic instances of the same static instruction or variable.
Results show that 99.78% of error sites are pruned across twelve studied workloads, requiring only
a few expensive error injections to determine the vulnerability of all application-level error sites.
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While performing error injection experiments on the remaining error sites (one at a time) is
practical, it still requires significant simulation time. Therefore, Relyzer proposes and employs a
gang error simulator called GangES as a performance enhancement technique. GangES bundles
multiple error (pilot) simulations and periodically compares simulation states to allow early termi-
nation of equivalent ones, saving simulation time that is otherwise needed to run the application to
completion and verify the output. GangES attempts to show equivalence between error sites from
different static instructions and variables that were not considered by Relyzer earlier. Results show
that GangES provides a total error simulation time savings of 51%.
The second part of the thesis employs Relyzer’s capability of identifying virtually all SDC-causing
program locations for three different purposes.
• Developing SDC-targeted application-centric error detectors is a primary application of Re-
lyzer. To achieve this goal, this thesis employs Relyzer to identify and analyze program
properties that appear around most SDC-producing program locations. Exploiting this anal-
ysis, it then develops low cost program-level error detectors that are shown to be effective in
reducing the reliance on expensive (instruction-level) redundancy for full SDC coverage.
• Architects often over-provision systems for higher resiliency, trading off power or performance,
due to lack of efficient techniques that allow such tuning. Relyzer enables tuning for resiliency
by identifying virtually all SDC-vulnerable program locations and selectively adding error
detectors. Employing Relyzer and the SDC-targeted error detectors (developed as a part of the
first application), this thesis obtains practical and flexible points on performance vs. resiliency
trade-off curves. For example, for an average SDC reduction of 90% and 99%, the average
execution overheads of this approach versus selective redundancy alone are respectively 12%
vs. 30% and 19% vs. 43%.
• This thesis also studies (previously proposed) pure program analyses based metrics and some
derivatives that do not need error injection experiments as faster alternatives to identify SDC-
causing program locations. Although the results are largely negative, they provide evidence
that such models are not straightforward to determine and signify the importance of Relyzer.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As process technology scales, the increasingly smaller devices become susceptible to a variety of
in-field hardware failure sources; e.g., high-energy particle strikes (or soft-errors), voltage droops,
wear-out, and design bugs [2, 6, 11]. This increases the likelihood of a hardware failure in the field.
Therefore, future systems must deploy low cost in-field resiliency solutions to guarantee continuous
error-free operation.
Traditional resiliency solutions use heavy amounts of redundancy (in space or time) to detect,
diagnose, and recover from hardware errors. Owing to their prohibitive costs, such mechanisms are
increasingly unacceptable for modern commodity systems. Instead, there is a growing recognition
that a wide spectrum of the commodity space will accept only much lower cost solutions (in area,
power, and performance), perhaps at the cost of tolerating very occasional failures.
Recently, there has been a surge of research in software anomaly based error detection tech-
niques [15, 17, 28, 32, 34, 42, 45, 60] that provide such promising low cost alternatives. These
techniques detect only those hardware errors that corrupt software execution by monitoring for
anomalous software behavior using simple, low cost monitors. Since error detection occurs at a high
level and relatively rarely, diagnosis and recovery can be more complex and have a higher overhead
(but within the constraints of mean time to repair and recovery). Despite the simplicity of their
detectors, these techniques have demonstrated impressively high detection rates. SWAT (SoftWare
Anomaly Treatment) [22, 27, 28, 29, 46, 53], a state-of-the-art resiliency solution that detects both
permanent and transient errors and diagnoses at the faulty core/microarchitectural unit granularity,
is an example of such a solution.
Unfortunately, some fraction of errors do escape the detection mechanism and silently impact
the correctness of the program output. Such errors are called silent data corruptions or SDCs.
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SWAT [22, 46] reports an aggregate SDC rate of <0.71% across several (compute-intensive, media,
and distributed client-server) workloads for both permanent and transient errors in all microarchi-
tectural units studied except the data-centric FPU. Most of these evaluations were conducted using
a microarchitecture level simulator. Similar SDC rates were also observed by SWAT-Sim [26], a
hierarchical simulation framework that evaluated SWAT with (more accurate) gate-level error mod-
els, and CrashTest’ing SWAT [43], an FPGA-based evaluation of SWAT with an industry strength
processor running an unmodified commercial operating system and modern applications.
Errors that result in SDCs produce corrupted application outputs without leaving any trace of
failure behind. Hence such a small SDC rate is still a hindrance for approaches like SWAT to become
practically successful. It is therefore crucial to significantly lower the SDC rate in a cost-effective
manner and provide a mechanism to tune for user-visible SDC rate vs. performance.
Whether a hardware error will produce an SDC is highly dependent on the application; therefore,
it is likely that the most cost-effective mechanism to reduce SDCs will be application-specific.
Moreover, with the ever-increasing constraints on power, performance, and area, application-specific
customization of resiliency solutions is desirable. Such a customization would require a detailed
resiliency profile of applications to identify potentially SDC-causing program locations. This profile
can be obtained through a comprehensive resiliency analysis that performs rigorous error injection
campaign for all errors that can possibly affect program execution. For most applications, this
translates to trillions of (time-consuming) injection experiments which is clearly infeasible. Hence
there is a need for a practical resiliency analysis technique that can identify all vulnerable (SDC-
causing) application locations.
Such an analysis would allow us to focus on potentially SDC-producing application sites and
develop targeted cost-effective mechanisms to convert SDCs to detections. This requires developing
and placing application-level (and in some cases application-specific) error detectors that incur
low overheads. This guided and customized approach can also provide programmers and system
designers the ability to effectively tune for resiliency vs. performance overhead, allowing them to
target any SDC rate or overhead.
2
1.1 Relyzer: Application resiliency analyzer
A comprehensive evaluation of an application’s resiliency, with a detection mechanism in-place,
requires studying the impact of all hardware errors of interest injected at each cycle of the appli-
cation’s execution (one at a time). Here, when we refer to an error, we include both the hardware
site where an error is injected as well as when it is injected in an application’s execution (the ap-
plication site). After injecting an error (at a given cycle), the application must be allowed to run
potentially to completion to determine if the error is masked, results in an SDC, or is detected
(in the latter case, the execution may be stopped on detection). For application benchmarks with
billions of instructions, this translates (conservatively) into trillions of error injection runs for most
benchmark suites and error models of interest. Such a comprehensive error injection campaign is
clearly infeasible.
Most error-injection based evaluation techniques [28, 32, 34] bound the experiment time by
studying a randomly selected sample of errors (typically of the order of thousands per application)
out of all the errors possible (more than a trillion errors for this study). While these methods may
provide statistical guarantees on SDC rates, certain errors that may be important to the application
may be sampled out. Equally important, such statistical sampling provides virtually no feedback
on which parts of the application remain vulnerable (other than the few instructions where errors
were injected) and might need protection in other ways to reduce the SDC rate. Therefore, it is
important to better identify the remaining vulnerable portions of the program and to reduce the
SDC rate with cost-effective detectors.
We therefore developed Relyzer, a resiliency analyzer that systematically analyzes all (dynamic)
application error sites to determine a minimal set for when transient errors need to be injected.1
Figure 1.1 briefly summarizes how Relyzer works. It first lists all application sites that can be
directly affected by our chosen transient errors.2 For some of these errors, Relyzer can directly
predict their outcome (detection, masking, or SDC) through simple static analysis and dynamic
1We only consider single-threaded applications in this work and leave the exploration of multithreaded applications
to future work.
2Since our focus is not on the hardware sites, we choose two examples: transient single-bit flip errors in (architec-
tural) integer registers and in output latches of address generation units.
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profiling of the error-free execution. These errors do not need detailed error injection experiments.
For the remaining errors, Relyzer primarily uses the insight that errors propagating “similarly”
through the program are likely to result in similar outcomes. We propose novel heuristics based
on static and dynamic control flow and data flow to capture the notion of “similar” for errors in
different types of instructions. Using these heuristics, we categorize application error sites into
equivalence classes. We then select a representative, which we call pilot, from each equivalence class
and thoroughly study it through a detailed error injection experiment.
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Figure 1.1: Relyzer overview. Relyzer first lists all application-level error sites (left box). Each
horizontal line represents a dynamic instruction. Each red circle is an error site; e.g., a bit of a
source register (not all sites for an instruction are shown for simplicity). Sites marked as P are
pruned by known-outcome pruning technique. Sites marked with the same digit (from 0 to 5) are
classified as the same equivalence class by equivalence-based pruning. Only one site from each
equivalence class is chosen for error injection (right box). Error injections in just these few sites
enable a complete application resiliency analysis.
Our results show that Relyzer significantly reduces the number of errors that require error in-
jection experiments [21]. Relyzer pruned about 99.78% of the total errors in the twelve applications
studied here (three to six orders of magnitude reduction for all but one application). We validated
the pruning techniques that use heuristics by matching the error injection outcomes of the repre-
sentative errors against outcomes of a sample of errors they each represent. Each pruning technique
and error model combination individually gave an accuracy of >92%, averaged across all studied
applications. Overall, with the combination of all pruning techniques, Relyzer was able to correctly
determine the outcomes of 96% of all errors, averaged across all twelve applications studied.
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1.1.1 GangES: Speeding up resiliency analysis
While Relyzer is certainly more practical than comprehensive pure error injections, it still needs
significant running time (about 72 hours for a set of eight applications on a cluster of 172 nodes).
Most of this time (about 65%) is spent in simulating errors injected in the pilot instructions that
result in masking or SDCs (the remaining are detected, and majority of detections occur soon after
error injection). Each error injection experiment simulates the entire application from the point
where the error is injected and compares the output with the error-free output to categorize the
outcome of the error as an SDC or application-level masking.
We propose a mechanism and tool that determines which of Relyzer’s pilots will produce the
same error outcomes. This technique bundles and runs multiple error simulations (of Relyzer’s
pilots) and periodically compares the state of these simulations at certain application points –
those with identical states will produce the same outcomes and only one in each such set needs
to continue and complete its full simulation. The early termination of equivalent simulations can
potentially save significant time. We call this tool Gang Error Simulator or GangES3 and employ
it to enhance the performance of Relyzer. While Relyzer mostly focused on showing equivalence
between error sites from different dynamic instances of the same static instruction or between error
sites of instructions with a def and use of the same variable, GangES looks for equivalence between
error sites in dynamic instances of different static instructions using (same or) different variables
(Figure 1.2). GangES is not able to entirely eliminate simulating an equivalent error site; instead,
it enables terminating the simulation much faster (for several error injection runs in a gang of error
simulations) than it would take to naturally complete the simulation. The two key challenges for
GangES are: (i) when to compare the state of two error simulations and (ii) what state to compare.
A judicious choice for when to compare (which execution points) is critical because the instruc-
tion sequences executed by multiple error simulations may temporarily diverge but merge again.
A judicious choice of what to compare is also critical because naively comparing all register and
memory locations can be prohibitively inefficient.
For when to compare, we select program locations where multiple error simulations would reach
3Pronounced as gan-jeez.
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Figure 1.2: Outlining additional error site equivalence that GangES provides over Relyzer. GangES
attempts to show equivalence between multiple error simulations from different instances of static
instructions with (same or) different variables that are not considered by Relyzer.
even if the error (temporarily) exercised different system events and branch directions. We lever-
age the previously proposed program structure tree (PST) from the compiler literature for this
purpose [25]. A program structure tree organizes an application’s control flow graph (CFG) into
nested single-entry single-exit (SESE) regions.4 For every execution that exercises the entry edge
of a region, the exit edge will be exercised, irrespective of the data and the error (as long as the
error path follows the CFG). Therefore, for every error simulation where errors are injected in a
particular SESE region, the corresponding SESE exit edge would be exercised, providing a definite
program location to compare execution states. We also perform the state comparison whenever
the SESE exit edge of the immediately encapsulating SESE region is reached. This structure also
identifies program locations where potentially few program variables are alive, limiting the amount
of state to compare. We compare all the (potentially) live registers at these points and any memory
locations that have been stored until these points.
Our results show that a large fraction of error simulations do not need full application simulation
and checking of the output to identify the outcome of the error injection [23]. Only 47% required
full simulation. 94% of the error simulations that were saved by our approach required only 2,850
4Formally, a SESE region is defined in a graph with an ordered edge pair (a,b) of distinct control flow edges a
and b where a dominates b; i.e., every path from start to b includes a; b postdominates a; every path from a to exit
includes b; and every cycle containing a also contains b.
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number of instruction executions, averaged across our applications. Overall, we found that GangES
replaced Relyzer’s error simulation time of approximately 12,600 hours for eight of our workloads
with 6,110 hours, providing a wall-clock time savings of 51.5%.
1.2 Applications of Relyzer
We employed Relyzer to achieve the following three objectives: (1) analyzing SDC-causing program
locations and adding error detectors to prevent SDCs, (2) tuning application resiliency at low cost
allowing system architects to efficiently trade off reliability vs. performance, and (3) evaluating
pure (static and dynamic) program analyses based metrics (and a combination of them) that aim to
identify SDC-causing program locations with significantly less effort and runtime when compared
to Relyzer.
1.2.1 Reducing silent data corruptions
We identified virtually all SDC-causing error sites by performing error injections in the Relyzer-
identified sites. Investigating these SDC-causing error sites revealed that only a small fraction of
static instructions cause most SDCs (virtually all the SDCs were caused by approximately 20%
of static instructions for the studied applications). Prior work has made similar observations and
applied selective instruction-level duplication to increase the detection rate [16, 52]. However, we
observed that the small fraction of SDC-causing static instructions consume a much higher fraction
of the execution time (in number of dynamic instructions). Our results indicate that protecting all
SDC-causing instructions through instruction-level duplication may incur 50% overhead on average,
assuming a conservative one cycle overhead per covered instruction. This high overhead is consistent
with that reported for previous selective instruction-based redundancy techniques, and motivates
selective detection techniques that are much more cost effective than instruction-level redundancy.
We therefore focus on developing an error detection scheme that converts SDCs to detections
with low overhead. But first, we need to answer the following two key questions: where to place the
error detectors and what detectors to use. We address the first question by placing the detectors in
program locations where errors from many SDC-causing instructions propagate into few quantities
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(or variables). For detectors in these locations, we exploit program-level properties that hold true
for these (potentially) error carrying quantities. In our work, we place our detectors at the end
of loops and function calls that contain SDC-causing instructions, and detect errors by testing
program-level properties on variables that are live at these points (e.g., comparing the outcomes of
similar computations and known value equalities). We find that our detectors provide an average
SDC coverage of 84% with an average execution overhead of 10% [20].
1.2.2 Tuning resiliency at low cost
Hardware and software architects continuously balance performance, power, and resiliency to meet
ever increasing design constraints. However, selecting a design choice and evaluating it remains a
tedious process. Since efficient tools and techniques to tune resiliency are unavailable, architects
often over-provision systems for higher resiliency (trading off performance or power).
Relyzer, for the first time, enables tuning resiliency by identifying virtually all SDC-vulnerable
program locations. This allows architects to target any resiliency budget by protecting just the
desired set of vulnerable program locations. Utilizing this approach we achieved the ability to obtain
a set of near-optimal detectors for any SDC coverage target,5 allowing us to obtain continuous SDC
coverage vs. performance trade-off curves. Using our low cost detectors and selective instruction-
level duplication for instructions not covered by our detectors, we present continuous SDC coverage
vs. execution overhead trade-off curves for our applications [20]. Compared to similar curves with
selective instruction-level redundancy alone, our approach yields much better execution overheads
for all SDC coverage targets of interest on average; e.g., 12% vs. 30% overhead for 90% SDC
coverage. The ability to quantify such curves, achieved for the first time, enables programmers and
system designers to effectively tune for resiliency vs. overhead, allowing them to target any SDC
coverage with the lowest cost combination of our detectors.
5SDC coverage is defined as the fraction of SDCs converted to detections.
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1.2.3 Evaluating pure program analyses based metrics to find SDCs
Relyzer makes it possible to list SDC-causing instructions but it requires detailed dynamic profiles
of applications (majority of which are input specific). This requirement may hinder its widespread
use. Alternatively, using simple (static and dynamic) pure program analyses based metrics to
identify program locations that are susceptible to producing SDCs is an attractive approach. These
techniques are much faster than Relyzer (and statistical error injection based techniques), but their
accuracy has not been previously validated.
Relyzer, for the first time, enables determining the accuracy of previously proposed pure program
analyses based techniques (because it provides error outcomes for virtually all instructions). We
studied and evaluated the approach proposed by [41] and some derivatives.6 Specifically, the metrics
we evaluated are cumulative and average fanout and lifetime and dynamic instruction count, which
are defined for every static instruction as described in Section 6.1. We also evaluate combinations
of these metrics using linear models based on regression techniques that use these metrics to predict
SDCs produced by the instructions.
Our results were largely negative, meaning that we could not identify a common metric that finds
SDC-producing instructions with high accuracy. It is possible that other pure program analyses
techniques provide better results, but a comprehensive study is beyond the scope of this thesis. We
believe our results here provide evidence that such models are not straightforward to determine and
signify the importance of Relyzer.
1.3 Summary of contributions
• Relyzer: Application resiliency analyzer [21]: Relyzer systematically analyzes all appli-
cation error sites to obtain a detailed reliability profile of applications. It employs novel error
pruning techniques that reduce the error-injection experiments needed by either predicting
their outcomes or showing them equivalent to others. This smart selective error evaluation
technique prunes 99.78% of error sites across twelve studied workloads. We further show that
only 0.004% represent 99% all error sites (providing a coverage of 99%) and performing error
6This effort was led by my colleague Radha Venkatagiri.
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injections in these sites is practically viable.7 This allows identifying all the application sites
that are vulnerable to SDCs (the equivalence classes whose representatives result in SDCs).
To our knowledge, Relyzer is the first work to develop such a notion of error equivalence for
application error sites (analogous to that of hardware error equivalence). Validation experi-
ments show that the selected errors represent the rest of the errors with an average accuracy
of 96% for the studied error models and applications.
– GangES: A gang error simulator to reduce error simulation time [23]: We
proposed, implemented, and evaluated the effectiveness of GangES as a performance
enhancement mechanism for Relyzer. GangES bundles multiple error simulations (of
Relyzer pilots) and periodically compares the state of these simulations at certain ap-
plication points – those with identical states will produce the same outcomes and only
one among them needs to complete to identify the outcome (SDC or masking). Our re-
sults show that GangES replaced Relyzer’s error simulation time of approximately 12,600
hours for eight of our applications with 6,110 hours, providing a wall-clock time savings
of 51.5%.
• Applications of Relyzer
– Understanding SDC-causing program properties and developing cost effec-
tive error detectors [20]: We analyzed program instructions that cause >90% of the
SDCs and identified a few program properties that appear repeatedly within the same
application and even across different applications. Using this analysis, we developed low
cost detectors that are effective in reducing SDCs. These detectors were placed at the
end of loops and function calls. They invoke program-level property checks on a few
variables that potentially carry errors from a large number of SDC causing instructions.
We find that our detectors provide an average SDC coverage of 84% with an average
execution overhead of 10%.
7 With our existing simulation speeds, errors in every 8th bit of a given hardware error site (e.g., architectural
register) can be simulated in approximately 21 days on a cluster of 200 cores.
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– Effective SDC coverage vs. execution overhead trade-off curves [20]: Using our
low cost detectors, we present continuous SDC coverage vs. execution overhead trade-off
curves for our applications. These curves fall back to instruction-level redundancy for
the sites that our program-level detectors cannot cover. Compared to similar curves with
instruction-level redundancy alone, our approach yields much better execution overheads
for all SDC coverage targets of interest on average; e.g., 12% vs. 30% overhead for 90%
SDC coverage and 19% vs. 43% for 99% coverage. The ability to quantify such curves
enables programmers and system designers to effectively tune for resiliency vs. overhead,
allowing them to target any SDC coverage with the lowest cost combination of our
detectors.
– Evaluating program analysis based metrics to find SDCs [23]:
Using simple (static and dynamic) program properties to identify program locations that
are susceptible to producing SDCs (instead of using Relyzer) is an attractive alterna-
tive. This approach is much faster, but its accuracy has not been previously validated.
Relyzer, for the first time, enables determining the accuracy of (previously proposed)
program analysis based techniques. We studied and evaluated multiple metrics such as
cumulative and average fanout and lifetime and dynamic instruction count. We also eval-
uate combinations of these metrics using linear models based on regression techniques.
Our results were largely negative, meaning that we could not identify a common metric
that finds SDC-producing instructions with high accuracy. Our results provide evidence
that such models are not straightforward to determine and signify the importance of
Relyzer.
1.4 Organization
The following chapter outlines SWAT. Chapter 3 proposes and evaluates Relyzer. Chapter 4 pro-
poses and evaluates how GangES further reduces Relyzer’s application resiliency evaluation time.
Chapter 5 explains and evaluates the low cost program-level error detectors we developed to reduce
SDCs. It also presents the SDC coverage vs. performance curve we obtained to tune resiliency at
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low cost.8 Chapter 6 applies Relyzer to evaluate simple (static and dynamic) program properties
that aim to identify SDC-causing program locations with little effort and runtime when compared
to Relyzer. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the work and outlines future directions.
8Most of the text in Chapters 3 and 5 is taken from the original publications [21] and [20] respectively.
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Chapter 2
Background: SWAT: SoftWare
Anomaly Treatment
This chapter presents a software anomaly based hardware resiliency solution called SWAT, which
forms a baseline for the remaining of the techniques presented in this thesis. SWAT [28, 27, 26, 22, 43]
deploys software-centric hardware error detection, diagnosis, and recovery techniques for treating
in-field hardware failures and providing application resiliency. SWAT’s detailed evaluations showed
the effectiveness of the anomaly based error detectors in detecting both permanent and transient
errors, which are also outlined in this chapter. Towards the end, a summary of SWAT’s results is
also presented which shows the observed SDC rates.1 Readers familiar with anomaly based error
detection techniques can skip this chapter.
Two high level observations that drive SWAT work are: (1) any hardware resiliency solution
should handle only those errors that affect software execution and (2) despite the growing reliabil-
ity threat, error-free operation remains the common case and must be optimized. Hence, SWAT
detects hardware errors by watching for anomalous software behavior using zero to low overhead
hardware and software monitors. This error detection mechanism is largely oblivious to the underly-
ing hardware error mechanism, treating hardware errors analogous to software bugs and potentially
leveraging solutions for software reliability to amortize overhead. Given that error detection occurs
at a high level, diagnosis and recovery are more complex. However, since diagnosis and recovery
are invoked only in the relatively rare event of an error, a higher overhead is acceptable (but within
the constraints of mean time to recovery).
1I played an important role in developing several (but not all) techniques presented in this chapter, but the contents
of this chapter are largely presented as background and are not among the primary contributions of this thesis.
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2.1 Error detection
The SWAT work proposed hardware error detection that employs very low cost monitors to de-
tect anomalous software behavior with very little hardware or software support [28, 46]. Speficially,
SWAT deploys detectors for fatal traps, which are not thrown in normal execution and are indicators
of anomalous software behavior (e.g., division by zero), hangs, high-OS, which detect abnormally
high amount of OS activitiy (more than 50,000 instructions spent contiguously) except for system
calls and interrupts, and out-of-bounds accesses to addresses that are outside legal boundaries. Re-
sults showed that these detectors achieve an aggregate SDC rate of <0.71% across several (compute-
intensive, media, and distributed client-server) workloads for both permanent and transient errors in
all microarchitectural units studied except the data-centric FPU [46, 22]. Subsequently, the iSWAT
framework proposed using mined likely program invariants from the application to augment these
hardware-only detectors [53]. Although these invariants further reduce the SDC rate, this thesis
does not explore these detectors as they required changes to the application binary and significant
runtime in capturing the invariants.
2.2 Error diagnosis
After an error detection, control is transferred to SWAT firmware that initiates diagnosis. The
diagnosis mechanism identifies whether the source of the error is a software bug, transient or per-
manent hardware error, or a false positive (from iSWAT and a heuristic detector). In the case of a
permanent error, it identifies the faulty core and the faulty microarchitectural component for repair
or reconfiguration.
A novel diagnosis algorithm called mSWAT was developed to identify the faulty core. mSWAT
deterministically replays (and records) the anomaly activating trace of each thread (in a multi-
threaded application) in isolation and looks for divergence among the two (original and replayed)
executions [22]. If no divergence is observed then the source of the error is diagnosed as either a
deterministic software bug or an iSWAT false positive and an appropriate software layer is notified.
On an event of a divergence, mSWAT performs a third replay of the divergent thread and compares
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its execution with the earlier recorded execution. This comparison leads us to the diagnosis decision,
identification of the faulty core. To reduce the hardware overhead, mSWAT emulates the isolated
deterministic replays (in software through firmware support). It also implements an iterative al-
gorithm that repeatedly records and replays executions for 100K instruction, limiting the record
storage size. Overall, mSWAT implemented emulated Triple-Modular Redundancy (TMR) to di-
agnose the faulty core with zero performance overhead in error-free cases. Our results show that
this technique achieves high diagnosability of over 95% with low diagnosis latency (98% diagnosed
within 10 million cycles) and low hardware support.2
Based on the reconfigurable granularity present in the system, it may be desirable to diagnose
the faulty microarchitectural component. Trace based fault diagnosis (TBFD) achieves this goal
with the help of another error-free core, availability of which is already known through mSWAT [27].
The key insight here is that the execution that generated the software anomaly can be used as a
test trace to repeatedly activate any errors present in order to incrementally perform diagnosis.
2.3 Error recovery
Since the system state may be corrupted before an error detection, SWAT relies on backward error
recovery schemes like checkpointing for system recovery. Recent work has proposed low overhead
checkpoint and restore mechanisms that efficiently record the changes since the previous checkpoint
in hardware with recovery intervals ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions of cycles and
rollback the changes on an error detection to reach a pristine system state [58, 55].
An important, but commonly ignored, aspect of error recovery is the output commit problem.
Since external outputs cannot be rolled back after commit, they should be released only when
they are known to be error-free. These outputs must therefore be buffered for the duration of
the recovery interval, potentially impacting error-free performance. Although ReVive-I/O handles
output buffering in a modern system with relatively low performance impact [37], it relies on
dedicated software to buffer and drain high-level output commands to the devices. While such
a software solution avoids hardware overhead, buffering outputs in software has some significant
2An earlier version of this technique [22] is presented in my masters thesis [19].
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limitations. For example, the software that buffers the outputs is itself is vulnerable to in-core errors,
resulting in possibly committing erroneous external outputs. Further, the buffering software needs
to be written while accounting for device-specific output semantics, requiring fairly sophisticated
modifications for every new class of devices supported.
Therefore, SWAT proposed a solution that employs dedicated hardware to buffer low-level ex-
ternal outputs (stores to I/O space) in a hardware structure until they are verified to be error-
free [29, 46, 47]. This solution is device-oblivious and can easily support a variety of devices,
providing a practical approach. An evaluation of the error-free overheads shows that at short
checkpoint intervals of up to 100K instructions, this technique incurs a performance overhead of
< 5% and an area overhead of < 2KB. At a recovery interval of 100K instructions for server work-
loads, 94% of the injected permanent and transient errors are either masked or recovered without
affecting application output, 4% are detected but not recovered, and only 44 (0.25%) of the injected
17,920) errors corrupt the application outputs and result in SDCs. Results also indicate that in the
presence of I/O, this high system recovery rate cannot be achieved without output buffering and
device recovery.
2.4 Detailed evaluation of SWAT detectors
SWAT has been evaluated using microarchitectural simulators, which simplify many of the low-level
design features of a processor. Hence, it is important to evaluate SWAT’s detectors on a realistic
system to validate the results obtained through less detailed models. An accurate evaluation of
SWAT needs to model a processor at gate-level because real faults manifest at the gate level and can
impact software behavior differently from microarchitecture-level error models. Such an evaluation
environment must have the ability to quickly run thousands of instructions and a full software stack
(e.g., OS and application) because these layers can influence error propagation and thus software
behavior.
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2.4.1 Hierarchical error simulation
SWAT-Sim presents an error injection infrastructure that uses hierarchical simulation to study
the system-level manifestations of permanent (and transient) gate-level errors [26]. To achieve
speed close to a microarchitectural simulator and minimize overhead, SWAT-Sim only simulates
the component of interest (the faulty component) at gate-level by invoking a gate-level simulation
of the component on-demand. SWAT-Sim observes a small average performance overhead of under
3x for the components it simulated, when compared to pure microarchitectural simulations.
SWAT was evaluated using SWAT-Sim by studying the system-level manifestations of errors
injected in a Decoder, an Arithmetic and Logic Unit (ALU), and an Address Generation Unit
(AGEN) of a superscalar processor. Results indicate that SWAT detectors are effective in detecting
permanent hardware errors even for gate-level error models. This evaluation approach, however, is
complex to implement because it has to interface both microarchitectural and gate-level models of
each component and has been proposed for only a limited number of components.
2.4.2 CrashTest’ing SWAT
An approach to achieve higher accuracy, speed, and processor coverage is to use reconfigurable
hardware, such as Field- Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), to emulate faults in digital designs.
The CrashTest’ing SWAT project built a platform on the OpenSPARC project [4], augmented with
SWAT detectors and the CrashTest infrastructure [44] to allow for error injection experiments with
detailed error models, thereby achieving performance or accuracy. This platform (OpenSPARC
+ SWAT detectors + CrashTest on an FPGA) allows accurate gate-level evaluation of hardware
errors across the entire processor design and runs complete applications on top of a full OS and
hypervisor [43]. This platform was used to evaluate the effectiveness of SWAT’s detectors with
a total of 30,800 stuck-at and 20,830 path-delay error injection experiments across five SPECInt
2000 benchmarks. Overall, these experiments validate the results previously reported by software-
based simulations of SWAT, but also reveal some interesting differences: (1) a high error masking
rate (62.56% of experiments); (2) silent data corruptions (0.79% of experiments) are concentrated
within a handful of functional units in the processor data path; (3) the range of software anomalies
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detected is much wider than recognized in previous evaluations of SWAT.
2.4.3 SWAT detection summary
Results from one of the most comprehensive evaluations of SWAT detectors are summarized in
Figure 2.1 [46, 22]. In this study, the following SWAT detectors are employed – Fatal traps,
Hangs, Kernel panic, App-abort, High-OS, and Out-of-bounds. These results are obtained by
injecting permanent errors (stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1) and transient errors (bit-flips) in latches of a
representative mix of microarchitectural structures in a modern out-of-order processor (Table 2.1)
using a microarchitecture level simulator. These errors were injected while simulating 4 server
workloads (apache, sshd, squid, and mysql), all 16 SPEC CPU 2000 benchmarks, and 6 multi-
threaded media applications (ray tracing, face recognition, mpeg encoder, mpeg decoder, lu, and
bodytrack) running OpenSolaris OS. In this study, the High-OS detector was disabled for the server
workloads as these daemons predominantly operate in privileged mode. The out-of-bounds detector
was not employed for media workloads. A total of about 46,000 error injections were performed such
that the error bars in the results (in each bar in Figure 2.1) are <2% at 99% confidence interval.
µarch structure Error location
Instruction decoder Input latch
Integer ALU Output latch
Register bus Bus on reg file write
Physical int reg file An int physical register
Reorder Buffer (ROB) Entry’s src/dst reg id
Reg Alias Table (RAT) Log→ phys register map
Address unit (AGEN) Virtual address output
Table 2.1: Error injection locations.
The outcome of an error injection is categorized as detected if a deployed SWAT monitor was
fired. For injections where the application outputs were produced, these outputs were compared
with the expected (error-free) outputs. If there is no mismatch then the outcome is declared as
masked. If the output is different from the expected output but is tolerated by the application (such
as PSNR >50dB for MpegEnc and MpegDec and lossless compressed output for gzip), the outcome
is categorized as SDC-tolerated [46, 22]. Outputs that are not tolerated by the applications are
categorized as SDC-not-tolerated.
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Figure 2.1: SDC rates from permanent and transient errors injected into non-FP units in server,
SPEC, and media workloads. Numbers on the top of each bar show the percentage of injected
errors that were categorized as SDC-not-tolerated. The low rates show that the SWAT detectors
are highly effective in detecting hardware faults.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the results and shows that low cost SWAT detectors achieve low rates
for errors categorized as SDC-not-tolerated. Combining SDC-tolerated and SDC-not-tolerated cat-
egories, aggregate SDC rates of <0.71% were observed across all the studied (compute-intensive,
distributed client-server, and media) workloads for both permanent and transient errors in all mi-
croarchitectural units studied except the data-centric FPU.
2.5 Summary
This chapter presented SWAT, a complete resiliency solution that detects, diagnoses, and recovers
from in-field hardware errors. SWAT deploys near zero cost anomaly detectors that achieve an
aggregate SDC rates of <0.71% across several workloads for both permanent and transient errors
in all microarchitectural units studied except the data-centric FPU based on microarchitectur level
simulations.
Since errors that produce SDCs escape the placed detectors and corrupt application outputs,
even the small SDC rates as reported in Figure 2.1 are a hindrance in deploying SWAT as a low
cost resiliency solution. All (prior) SWAT evaluations are performed using statistical error injection
19
experiments where thousands of error sites were randomly selected for evaluation from trillions of
possible sites (number of applications × application execution points × number of hardware units
× number of bit locations). Such an evaluation cannot provide insight into all the remaining SDC-
prone error sites, which can be crucial in developing a more effective error detection mechanism.
To overcome this challenge and as a significant step towards achieving the goal of full resiliency,
this thesis focuses on developing techniques to fully evaluate an application’s resiliency for transient
errors in the following chapters. Expanding the study to permanent errors requires future research.
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Chapter 3
Relyzer: Application Resiliency
Analyzer for Transient Errors
As explained in the previous chapter, SWAT presents a low cost resiliency solution that detects
transient (and permanent) hardware errors with high efficacy. SWAT reports that only a small
fraction of hardware errors remain undetected and corrupt application outputs, producing silent
data corruptions or SDCs (Section 2.4.3). Specifically, an aggregate of <0.71% of studied errors
produce SDCs across several (compute-intensive, media, and distributed client-server) workloads
based on microarchitectural simulations in all units studied except the data-centric FPU.
Since errors that result in SDCs produce corrupted application output without leaving any trace
of failure behind, even such a small SDC rate is still a hindrance for approaches like SWAT to become
practically successful. It is therefore crucial to significantly lower the SDC rate in a cost-effective
manner and provide a mechanism to tune for user-visible SDC rate vs. performance.
Whether a hardware error will produce an SDC is highly dependent on the application; therefore,
it is likely that the most cost-effective mechanism to reduce SDCs will be application-specific.
Moreover, with the ever-increasing constraints on power, performance, and area, application-specific
customization of resiliency solutions is desirable. Such a customization would require a detailed
resiliency profile of applications to identify potentially SDC-causing program locations. This profile
can be obtained through a comprehensive resiliency analysis that performs a rigorous error injection
campaign for all errors that can possibly affect program execution. For most applications, this
translates to trillions of (time-consuming) injection experiments which is clearly infeasible. Hence
there is a need for a practical resiliency analysis technique that can identify all vulnerable (SDC-
causing) application locations.
This chapter presents Relyzer, a resiliency analyzer that aims to obtain a complete application
resiliency profile for transient hardware errors. It systematically analyzes all (dynamic) applica-
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tion error sites to determine a minimal set for when transient errors need to be injected, instead of
performing rigorous injection campaign on all errors that can possibly affect program execution. Re-
lyzer achieves this goal by employing a series of novel application level error site pruning techniques
that either predict outcomes of errors (without performing detailed error injection experiments) or
categorize application error sites into equivalence classes and select only a representative from each
equivalence class for error injection experiments.
3.1 Error pruning techniques
Relyzer systematically analyzes all application error sites and carefully selects a small subset for
thorough error injection experiments such that it can still estimate the outcomes of all the errors in
the application. To achieve this goal, Relyzer applies a set of pruning techniques that are classified as
known-outcome and equivalence-based pruning techniques. The known-outcome techniques largely
use static (and some dynamic) program analyses to predict the outcome of an error. The equivalence-
based techniques prune errors by showing them equivalent to others using static and dynamic
analyses and/or heuristics.
Relyzer first enumerates all the errors that can impact the application. We require an error-free
execution trace for a given application (and input) for this step. Each dynamic instruction instance
in the trace forms a potential application error site. At this site, we consider injecting hardware
errors that would be exercised by this instruction (one error at a time). Since our focus is on the
choice of application error sites and not on exhaustively studying all hardware errors, we choose
to study transient errors (single bit flips) in architectural integer registers and in output latches
of address generation units. As an example, consider an add instruction with register operands
g1, g2, and l1 as an instruction appearing in the dynamic instruction trace. We consider injecting
single-bit-flips in the integer registers g1, g2, and l1 that are accessed by this instruction (one at
a time, in different bits). Errors in the address generation unit will be considered only when it is
exercised; i.e., in load and store instructions.
While enumerating the list of all application error sites, Relyzer stores all the error related
information in a data structure called the error database, shown in Figure 3.1. In particular, it stores
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Figure 3.1: Error database. The first three fields in the first table store basic information regarding
an error site and the static instruction. The bit min and bit max fields indicate the amount of
pruning performed by the known-outcome pruning techniques – errors in the bits between bit min
and bit max are pruned and their predicted outcome is recorded in the expected outcome field. The
equivalent instruction and the erroneous unit ID fields store information for the def-use equivalence
pruning technique and the constant-based technique. The information regarding pilots that are
obtained by the store- and control-equivalence based pruning techniques is stored in a separate
table. It also stores some extra information that can aid the development of low cost detectors.
the identity of the static instruction (program counter), the hardware error sites that can affect the
instruction (e.g., names of registers), and the number of dynamic instances of the instruction. The
rest of the fields in Figure 3.1 apply to specific pruning techniques and are described with those
techniques.
Relyzer next applies the error pruning techniques on this initial set of errors. While the error
pruning is being performed, all the required information for successful computation of overall SDC
rate and the SDC rate for each static instruction is logged in the error database (Figure 3.1).
Additionally, some dynamic information to assist the later development of low cost detectors can
also be logged, but we leave the exploration of such information and detectors to future work.
3.1.1 Known-outcome pruning techniques
Bounding addresses: Transient hardware errors can make applications access memory locations
that fall out of the range of the allocated address space. Such accesses are likely to result in
detectable symptoms (e.g., fatal traps, segmentation errors, application aborts, and kernel panic).
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SWAT employs detectors specifically to detect such scenarios within recoverable latencies (e.g., out-
of-bounds detectors [46]). We do not need injection experiments to identify the outcome of most
such errors and can directly prune them as follows.
We determine the range of valid addresses, for both the stack and the heap, by studying the
dynamic memory profile of the application. To keep our implementation simple, we monitor global
and heap addresses together. This also eliminates the problem of distinguishing them from each
other while profiling. This approximation only makes our technique conservative if we assume
that the out-of-bounds detector can also detect errors in addresses that make accesses cross the
global-heap boundary.
Once we identify the range of the valid addresses, we prune errors that allow a memory instruc-
tion to access an invalid address (e.g., errors in high order bits of the address when the error-free
trace shows valid addresses are within lower order bits). This technique is applicable to memory
instructions (both loads and stores).
Bounding branch targets: Analogous to the bounding addresses case, an error that causes a
control instruction to jump to a location that is not in the application instruction space is likely to
result in a detectable symptom (e.g., SWAT’s fatal trap and app-abort detectors or an out-of-bounds
detector analogous to that for data addresses can detect such errors).
The address range that contains all possible targets can be obtained by noting the start and
the end of the text section of an application. Typically, the text section is small (for applications
with under million instructions; i.e., under 32 bits) and hence a large fraction (over 50% on 64-bit
machines) of errors in branch targets can be predicted as detected and pruned by this technique.
This bounding technique may not be directly applicable to jumps to shared libraries because the
registers used by these operations may already contain addresses that are out of the text section.
We performed an optimistic experiment on the studied error models and applications and found
that it only provides a pruning of approximately 0.5%. Hence, we do not include it in our study
here. However, this technique may be effective for other errors models, e.g., errors in immediate
operands. Many branch instructions specify PC-relative displacements as immediate operands, and
could benefit from this technique.
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Constant-based: In some logical operations, only a fraction of the bit locations in the source
operands are used to produce the destination register value. Several of these bit locations in the
source operand are usually discarded and hence errors in these bits get masked. Currently we apply
this technique only on logical shift operations, where the shift count is a constant. We prune errors
in the bit locations of the source register (non-constant operand) that are not be used to produce
the destination register value and treat them as masked.
This technique provides a modest benefit for unoptimized applications. We do not not report it
for the optimized applications because preliminary experiments showed that it provided insignificant
benefit for them.
Several other instruction specific pruning techniques (similar to the one above) have a potential
of providing added pruning. This is, however, a part of our future work.
Information for error database: Known-outcome based techniques prune errors by declaring
them as detected or masked. Hence, very little information is needed to be recorded in the error
database. We record the range of the bits that are pruned in the bit min and bit max field along
with the estimated outcome in the expected outcome field of the error database (Figure 3.1).
3.1.2 Equivalence-based pruning techniques
This class of pruning techniques eliminates errors that are equivalent to each other from the initial
set of error sites and retains only the representative errors (pilots) for thorough error injection
experiments. We further categorize pruning techniques in this section as precise and heuristic-based
based on whether they use accurate analyses or heuristics to form the equivalence classes.
Precise techniques
Def-use analysis: A register definition is created whenever a register is used as a destination
operand in an instruction. Errors in the definition of a register have similar behavior to that of
errors in the first use of this definition. Therefore, we prune out errors in the definition and retain
errors in the first use. Note that this technique prunes errors only in the definition and not in the
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uses. There can be multiple uses of a definition, and errors in different uses may have different error
propagation. Whenever a definition is pruned, we record the information of the first use at the
definition such that the outcomes of the errors in the first use can be related to that of definition’s
at a later stage (details of the recorded information is presented below).
Ideally, the destination register operands of all the instructions should be pruned by this tech-
nique. In our experiments, however, we prune errors in only those destination registers that have a
first use within the same basic-block. Since we implemented this technique as a static program pass,
accounting for this equalization in the error database (i.e., associating errors in of the first use to that
of the definition’s) was non-trivial for the cases where the def to first-use chains spanned across mul-
tiple basic blocks. Moreover, in the presence of conditional move operations it was unclear whether
a static pass can still prune errors without compromising on the precise association of a definition
with the first-use. Hence, we limited ourselves to a conservative but precise implementation.
Constant-based: We applied the principal of constant propagation to prune errors from the
operands of instructions that use constants. For such instructions, the effect of an error in the source
register (non-constant) operand can be studied directly in the destination operand; therefore, we
can prune errors from such source operands. This pruning technique is currently limited to only
those logical operations where a single-bit error in the source operand propagates as a single-bit
error in the destination (e.g., logical xor). This technique provides negligible benefits for optimized
applications. Hence we report it only for the unoptimized applications.
Information for error database: The entries of the error sites that are pruned by this technique
record the information of the error sites that now represent them. The pruned error site records the
identification of the representative error site, i.e., the program counter of the instruction and the
erroneous unit id from Figure 3.1. For example, a definition that is pruned by the def-use analysis
records the program counter of the instruction where the first use is found along with the erroneous
unit id of the first use.
Heuristic-based techniques
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Control-equivalence: This heuristic pruning technique uses the observation that errors propagat-
ing through similar code sequences are likely to behave similarly. It also uses the observation that
a majority of the errors appear in code sequences that are executed many times. Consider a static
instruction I with many dynamic instances in the error-free execution under consideration. The
pruning technique attempts to partition all these dynamic instances of I into equivalence classes,
based on the control flow path followed after the dynamic instance.
It is convenient to describe and implement the algorithm at the basic block level. The technique
uses the error-free application execution to enumerate all possible control flow paths up to a depth n
starting at the basic block that contains the instruction of interest. Depth is defined as the number
of branch or jump instructions encountered. For the paths that were exercised multiple times in
the execution, it randomly selects one dynamic occurrence, a pilot. It prunes all other unselected
executions of such paths (population) and assumes that errors in those dynamic executions are
represented by the selected ones (pilots). More precisely, a dynamic instruction instance on a pilot
path serves as a pilot for other instances with the same PC on the other paths in its population.
Figure 3.2 explains through an example how this pruning technique selects pilots. The figure
presents a control flow graph of a small program, with the basic blocks represented by the black
and grey circles with numbers on their sides. Assume the grey basic block is not exercised by
the dynamic execution of interest. Assume n = 5 (depth until which control flow is tracked).
Suppose we are interested in finding the representative pilots for an instruction in basic block 1.
We enumerate all control flow paths starting at basic block 1 up to a depth of 5 that are executed
in the dynamic error-free execution of interest. Basic block 4 is never executed and hence it does
not appear in the list of dynamically exercised paths. We identify each path as forming a new
equivalence class. There will be potentially many instances of such paths in the dynamic execution
trace. We randomly select one dynamic execution sequence for each equivalence class and name
it as the pilot for that class. As mentioned before, a dynamic instruction instance on a pilot path
serves as a pilot for other instances with the same PC on the other paths in its population.
We apply this technique to prune errors in all instructions other than stores and those that
affect stores within a basic block. In other words, we do not apply this technique on stores and
27
1 
2 3 
4 5 
6 
7 
8 
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1 → 3 → 7 → 1 → 2 → 5 
1 → 3 → 7 → 1 → 3 → 7 
1 → 2 → 5 → 6 → 7 → 1 
Figure 3.2: Control-equivalence. The figure shows a CFG for a small program starting at basic
block 1 and ending at basic block 8. We enumerate all dynamically exercised control paths up to
a depth, say 5. Here basic block 4 (showed in grey) never gets exercised. Therefore control flow
paths through this node do not appear on the list of dynamically exercised paths. The executions
along each of these paths form the equivalence classes for similar error outcomes.
the instructions that stores depend on. This is because the propagation of an error in a store also
depends on the addresses of the loads in the control flow path taken (only loads to the same address
as the store will propagate the error). The next technique described deals with this distinction. An
exception to the above are a few SPARC specific instructions; namely, save, restore, call, return, and
read state register. In this study, we do not inject errors in these instructions and therefore do not
consider them any further. We also do not inject errors in the dead instructions and do not consider
those any further either. Overall, this technique has the potential of pruning a large fraction of
the errors by softening the constraint on evaluating all dynamic occurrences from a specific code
section.
Store-equivalence: An error in a store instruction propagates through the loads that read the
erroneous values. Load addresses are not entirely captured by the control flow path taken after
the store. We therefore developed an alternate heuristic, called store-equivalence, for errors in
store instructions or in instructions that a store depends on. This heuristic captures the error
propagation behavior by observing the addresses that a store writes in an error-free execution and
recording all read accesses to this address. It treats the errors in stores differently whenever a
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Figure 3.3: Store-equivalence. Store 1 and Store 2 are two store instructions from the same static
instruction writing to addresses A and B respectively. Load 1a with program counter PC-L1a and
Load 1b with program counter PC-L1b are two load instructions reading the value from address
A. Similarly, Load 2a and Load 2b are two loads from address B with program counters PC-L2a
and PC-L2b respectively. The store-equivalence heuristic requires that PC-L1a equal PC-L2a and
PC-L1b equal PC-L2b.
different permutations of loads instructions read the stored value.
Figure 3.3 illustrates our heuristic with an example. Consider Store 1 and Store 2 as two
dynamic store instruction instances from the same static instruction. To determine if the errors
in these two store instructions will have the same outcomes, we examine all the loads that return
the values written by these stores in the error-free execution, i.e., Load 1a and Load 1b for Store 1
and Load 2a and Load 2b for Store 2 from the figure. We first check whether the number of such
loads is the same (two for each store in the figure). If this is the case, then we check whether the
static instructions (program counters) of the corresponding loads are the same (e.g., if the program
counters of Load L1a and Load L2a are the same and if those of Load L1b and Load L2b are the
same in the figure). If these match, then we conclude that the two dynamic store instructions are
very likely to have similar error outcomes and we place them both in the same equivalence class.
Information for error database: We record the information regarding the pilots in the error
database (Figure 3.1). In particular, we record the unique pilot id and the size of the population
it represents. We can also record additional information such as the control path (sequence of
instructions) this pilot represents for control-equivalence based technique and usage pattern of the
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stored value (e.g., number of loads and their program counters) in the extra information field. This
information may be helpful for the applications of Relyzer (e.g., understanding and protecting SDC
causing error sites).
3.1.3 Implementation
Relyzer implements the pruning techniques using static and dynamic program analyses. For ex-
ample, the precise equivalence-based and known-outcome pruning techniques are implemented as
a static program pass (they, however, use basic dynamic application profile). Store- and control-
equivalence based pruning techniques are heavily dependent on the dynamic program information
and, hence, are implemented as dynamic analyses.
As a first step, Relyzer initializes the error database and computes the initial set of errors. The
information about the number of dynamic instances of each static instruction is required to compute
the size of initial set of errors and is obtained through a dynamic profile of the application. Relyzer
then applies the first pruning technique – known-outcome address bounding, which is implemented
as a static program pass. This technique requires the knowledge about the boundaries of stack and
heap addresses accessed during the entire course of the program and this information is obtained
through dynamic profiling. Relyzer next performs the def-use analysis (first equivalence based
pruning technique), which is also implemented as a static program pass. (For applications with
unoptimized codes, it also applies constant-based pruning technique at this step.)
Once these static techniques are applied, Relyzer prepares the application codes for the employ-
ment of the dynamic control- and store-equivalence based pruning techniques. It labels the static
instructions to mark the pruning techniques that will be applicable to them. For instructions within
a given basic block, all stores and the instructions that any store is dependent on are labeled to be
pruned by store-equivalence based technique. Since the dynamic store-equivalence based analysis
is performed only on store instructions, the identify of the store instruction is recorded with the
instructions that affect his store (in other words, the instructions that any store depends on also
record the identify of the store instruction.). Once the instructions for store-equivalence based prun-
ing technique are marked, all other remaining instructions (with the earlier mentioned exceptions)
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are marked to be pruned by control-equivalence based technique.
Relyzer then profiles the instructions and memory in more detail to obtain dynamic control- and
store-equivalence classes as discussed in section 3.1.2. As a last step it uses the store-equivalence
classes (for store instructions) and associates them with the instructions that recorded the identity
of these stores (as mentioned above) to obtains the respective classes for all instructions that stores
depends on. At this point Relyzer computes the remaining number of pruned errors by analyzing
the updated error database and terminates.
3.1.4 Computing SDC rates
Once all the pruning techniques are applied, the error injection experiments on the remaining error
locations are performed. The SDC rate of the application can now be computed by using the
information stored in the error database. Figure 3.1 shows the information we collected during the
pruning phase.
To compute the SDC rate for an error site, the outcomes of the pilots corresponding to that
error sites are observed. If no pilot produced an SDC, then the SDC rate for that pilot is zero. If
one or more pilots produce SDCs, then the sizes of the populations of all these pilots are added and
multiplied with the number of remaining bits in for that error site. This value is then divided by the
product of number of dynamic occurrences and the initial number of bits (prior to applying pruning
techniques) for that error site. The extra recorded information can also be utilized to understand
the execution conditions that might have led to an SDC. The SDC rate for the error sites that were
pruned by the precise equivalence-based techniques is obtained by simply computing the SDC rate
of the error site that represents this it.
The SDC rate at the (static) instruction level can be calculated by simply performing an arith-
metic average of the SDC rate at the error site level. A weighted average of the SDC rate at the
instruction level with weights being the number of dynamic occurrences of each instruction can be
performed to obtain the SDC rate of entire application.
31
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Workloads
We implemented the pruning techniques described in Section 3.1 for single-threaded applications
compiled for the SPARC V9 [61] architecture, assuming the hardware error models previously de-
scribed. We selected twelve applications – four each (randomly selected) from the SPLASH-2 [62],
PARSEC [10], and SPEC CPU2006 [24] benchmark suites. Table 3.1 provides a brief description of
these applications, including the inputs used, the dynamic instruction count, number of exercised
static instructions, and the number of errors prior to applying any pruning. We do not include
the initialization and the output phases of the applications in our study – these phases are usu-
ally dominated by file reads and writes, memory allocation and deallocation, etc. We found that
the effectiveness of the developed pruning techniques varies significantly depending on whether the
applications are optimized. We focus our results primarily on the optimized versions of the appli-
cations. Section 3.3.1, however, briefly summarizes the impact of optimizations for a subset of the
above applications. The dynamic instruction counts and the number of errors in Table 3.1 pertain
to the optimized version of the applications.
3.2.2 Error injection framework
As previously mentioned, the error models we study are single bit flips in architectural integer
registers and in the output latches of the address generation units (for loads and stores). Our error
injection simulation infrastructure uses a full system simulation environment comprising of Wind
River Simics [59] and the GEMS microarchitectural and memory timing simulator [33], running
our applications on the OpenSolaris operating system and compiled to the SPARC V9 ISA. This
framework is similar to that used in the previous work on SWAT (e.g., [28]) with some modifications.
Our framework allows us to inject errors at any point in the application execution. This is the
chosen application error site, as represented by a dynamic instruction in the error-free execution.
To inject an error, we start the application and execute it in functional mode (Simics-only) up
to 500 cycles before the chosen application error site. Then we start detailed timing simulation
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Benchmark
Suite
Application Description Input
Num. executed
instrns. after init
& before finish
phase
Num. Errors
Dynamic Static
Parsec 2.1
Blackscholes
Calculates prices of
options with
Black-Scholes partial
differential equation
sim-large 22.3 Million 538 1.9 Billion
Fluidanimate
Simulates an
incompressible fluid for
interactive animation
purposes
sim-small 611.4 Million 1,297 102.5 Billion
Streamcluster
Solves the online
clustering problem
sim-small 1.44 Billion 3,318 106 Billion
Swaptions
Computes prices of a
portfolio of swaptions
using Monte Carlo
simulations
sim-small 922.2 Million 1,696 97.3 Billion
SPLASH-2
FFT
1D Fast Fourier
Transform
64K points 548 Million 1,483 48.7 Billion
LU
Factors a matrix into
the product of a lower &
upper triangular matrix
512× 512
matrix
16× 16
blocks
402.8 Million 1,124 33.2 Billion
Ocean
Simulates large-scale
ocean movements based
on eddy and boundary
currents
258× 258
ocean
358 Million 20,322 21.7 Billion
Water
Evaluates forces and
potentials that occur
over time in a system of
water molecules
512
molecules
504.3 Million 3,812 36.6 Billion
SPEC-Int
2006
Gcc
Based on gcc Version
3.2, generates code for
Opteron
test 3.8 Billion 248,391 500.4 Billion
Libquantum
Simulates a quantum
computer running
Shor’s polynomial time
factorization algorithm
test 235.4 Million 2,922 27.4 Billion
Mcf
Vehicle scheduling using
a network simplex
algorithm
test 4.57 Billion 1,346 485.4 Billion
Omnet++
Uses the OMNet++
discrete event simulator
to model a large
ethernet campus
network
test 1.35 Billion 6,913 146 Billion
Table 3.1: Applications studied for Relyzer. The number of dynamic instructions, exercised static
instructions, and errors pertaining to the optimized versions of the applications.
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(Simics+GEMS) and inject the error when the application error site is reached. Thus, for address
generation unit errors, we flip the specified bit in the unit’s output latch when it generates the
address for the specified dynamic instruction. For integer register errors, we flip the specified bit
in the specified register when the specified dynamic instruction reads the register (for a source) or
writes the register (for a destination). The flipped bit retains its state until the latch or register
is overwritten. We then simulate the application for another 500 instructions in the detailed mode
before switching to the functional mode and running it to completion.
We check for all SWAT symptoms [46] (fatal traps, application aborts, and kernel panics) in
the detailed mode and a reduced set of symptoms (fatal traps, kernel panics, and system error
messages) in the functional simulation phase. If a symptom is detected or a timeout condition is
met (the application executes more than twice its expected runtime before producing the output),
then we terminate the simulation and the outcome is recorded as detected. Otherwise, the output
of the application is collected and compared with the error-free output. We record the outcome as
masked or an SDC depending on whether the two outputs are or are not the same respectively.
Note that when we inject an error, there is always an instruction that consumes an erroneous
value or uses an erroneous address. Thus, compared to pure microarchitecture-level injection sim-
ulations, we see no microarchitectural masking and very limited architectural masking. This is by
design since we wish to maximize the injections that might lead to SDCs.
3.2.3 Pruning techniques
The pruning techniques require both static and dynamic analyses of the application. The static
analyses study the binary and extract several properties that are either directly applied towards
error pruning or are later used by the dynamic technique. Since our error injection infrastructure is
developed for the SPARC V9 ISA model, we restrict our study to SPARC V9 binaries. We could not
find any publicly available tools to analyze SPARC binaries, so we developed our own static binary
analyzer that performs basic control flow and data flow analyses.1 Using this static infrastructure,
we traverse the application and create the set of all transient error sites. We then apply the static
1We use the dynamic branch profile to create a correctly connected control flow graph because jump and link
instructions create broken edges in the graph that may not be completed through static information alone.
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pruning techniques, compute the pruned error set, and collect information for dynamic analyses.
The dynamic analyzer profiles the branches, the memory access patterns (for store-equivalence
technique), instruction control flow patterns (for control-equivalence technique), etc. We use Wind
River Simics [59] to implement these dynamic profilers. Finally, we use the information from both
the static and dynamic analyses to generate the final pruned error set.
For store-equivalence pruning, we dynamically observe every store instruction, the addresses
they write to, and record all loads that read the stored value (as explained in Section 3.1.2). For
mcf, however, we record only the first ten loads instead of all loads for forming the store-equivalence
classes such that our store-equivalence algorithm finishes in a reasonable time of <10 hours.
To quantify the impact of the pruning techniques, we report the percentage of total errors that
are pruned (in total and by the individual techniques) and the absolute number of remaining errors
(pilots) that must be simulated to determine the resiliency of an application.
Validating pruning techniques
The control- and store-equivalence based error pruning techniques use heuristics and require
validation. Each of these pruning techniques chooses a dynamic instruction (pilot) to represent
the outcome of several other dynamic instructions (the population). We quantify the validity of
these techniques by quantifying the extent to which the pilots correctly represent the population.
For example, suppose the injection of an error in a pilot results in masking the error. Suppose
the injection of an analogous (hardware) error in all members of the population results in 98% of
the outcomes being masked and 2% detected or SDC. Then we say that the prediction rate of the
pilot is 98%. The overall prediction rate for the pruning techniques is the weighted average of the
prediction rate for all the pilots for that technique, weighted by the error populations represented
by the pilots.
To find the exact misprediction rate, ideally, we would run error injections for all the pilots and
all their associated populations. Simulating this combination is clearly prohibitive in simulation
time. To reduce this time, we first restrict our validations only to the optimized applications.
Further, for a given pilot, we randomly sample its population to determine the prediction rate. We
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select the sample size such that the 99% confidence interval for prediction is within 5% of the actual
prediction rate.2 We then inject transient errors in the pilot and the selected samples to obtain
the prediction rate. Ideally, we would inject errors in all bit locations in the appropriate erroneous
units for the pilot, but the simulation time would be prohibitive. We instead injected errors in every
8th bit (bits 0, 8, 16, 24, 32, 40, 48, and 56 for a 64-bit register or the output latch of the address
generation unit) that was not already pruned by the known-outcome pruning technique (e.g., if the
known-outcome pruning technique prunes higher-order 32 bits, then we inject errors only in bits 0,
8, 16, and 24).
Sampling the population for a given pilot still leaves the problem that there are many pilots,
each of which would require a large number of simulations for validation. We therefore restricted the
number of pilots such that it was feasible to simulate all of them (and their sampled populations)
in the available time. We selected enough pilots such that the total number of error injections
we had to perform for validation (for pilots and the population) was over one million for each
of control- and store-equivalence (1,378,000 for control and 1,093,000 for store) across all error
models. In particular, for validating control-equivalence, we performed approximately 1,092,000
and 286,000 injections for integer register and address generation unit error models respectively.
For store-equivalence, he corresponding number of injections are 835,000 and 258,000. Further,
each selected pilot represented a population of at least 1,000. For the 99% confidence interval, our
average validation results for control-equivalence pruning have error bars of 1.84% and 3.67% for
the integer register and address generation unit error models respectively. For store-equivalence
pruning, the corresponding error bars are 2.85% and 4.61%.
3.3 Evaluation
3.3.1 Effectiveness of pruning techniques
Overall pruning effectiveness
Tables 3.2(a) and (b) show the overall effectiveness of Relyzer’s pruning techniques by presenting
2The pilot requires only one error injection experiment to obtain the outcome A. We can formulate the error
injection experiments for the population as a Bernoulli trial with outcomes being either A or not A. Assuming all the
experiments are independent, we can apply the principals of confidence intervals used for normal distributions.
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Application Initial errors Total Remaining errors
(in billion) pruning (in millions)
Blackscholes 1.9 99.99% 0.07
Ocean 21.7 99.99% 2.9
Libquantum 27.4 99.98% 4.1
LU 33.2 99.99% 1.1
Water 36.6 99.99% 2.1
FFT 48.7 99.99% 0.3
Swaptions 97.3 99.99% 0.6
Fluidanimate 102.5 99.91% 92
Streamcluster 106 99.99% 8.6
Omnet++ 146 99.99% 2.2
Mcf 485.4 99.43% 2,781
Gcc 500.4 99.88% 627.5
(a) Optimized applications.
Application Initial errors Total Remaining errors
(in billion) pruning (in millions)
Blackscholes 4.01 99.99% 0.03
FFT 61.18 99.99% 0.16
Libquantum 127.03 99.93% 3.40
LU 175.36 99.99% 0.80
Swaptions 318.66 99.99% 0.08
(b) Unoptimized applications.
Table 3.2: Effectiveness of Relyzer’s pruning on (a) optimized and (b) unoptimized applications.
The applications are in increasing order of total number of original errors.
the percentage of total errors pruned for the optimized and unoptimized applications respectively.
The tables also show the absolute number of total errors and the errors remaining after pruning.
The applications are ordered according to the total number of original errors.
For optimized applications, we find that Relyzer prunes an aggregate of 99.78% of all the studied
errors across all applications. The total number of errors that need to be simulated reduces from
1.6 trillion to 3.52 billion, a three to five orders of magnitude reduction for all applications except
mcf. The lowest pruning rate for a single application was 99.43% (for mcf) while most applications
saw a pruning rate of 99.99%. For mcf,3 two stores observed a pruning of 20%, bringing down mcf’s
overall pruning rate. The number of remaining errors in these two stores and the instructions that
these stores depend on alone accounted for 83% of the total remaining errors for mcf.
3For forming the store-equivalence classes for mcf, we accounted for the first ten loads instead of all loads so that
our algorithm finished in a reasonable time of <10 hours.
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Pruning effectiveness of individual techniques
Figures 3.4(a) and (b) show the effectiveness of Relyzer’s individual pruning techniques for the
optimized and unoptimized applications respectively. The stacks in each bar show the contributions
of the individual pruning techniques when applied in the order shown (bottom to top) for all the
errors in the application. There is no stack for constant-based pruning techniques in part (a) because
our preliminary experiments showed these techniques provide limited benefit for those applications.
Focusing on the optimized applications, we found that the known-outcome pruning technique
pruned an average of approximately 27% of all the errors. Def-use analysis prunes 15% of all
the errors on average. Thus, the above mostly static techniques alone provided approximately
42% of pruning across our applications. Control-equivalence is overall the most effective individual
technique for these applications, providing 48% of the pruning on average. Finally, store-equivalence
technique pruned about 10% of all the errors.
The unoptimized applications show slightly different behavior. First, store-equivalence provides
notably more pruning than in the optimized applications. A likely reason is that there are more
memory operations in unoptimized codes since they use the stack heavily and the registers poorly.
Moreover, these store operations are often represented by a small number of pilots because they
observe few permutations of loads during store-equivalence pruning. Second, the constant-based
techniques provide significantly more pruning for the unoptimized applications (about 6.5% of total
errors). We observed that the number of remaining errors increases significantly (by about 100%)
when this technique was excluded for the unoptimized applications. However, it had negligible
impact on optimized applications. Overall, figure 3.4 shows significant differences in the relative
effectiveness of the pruning techniques between the optimized and unoptimized codes, showing that
compiler optimizations do impact the behavior of error propagation.
Trading off simulation time with coverage
Although Relyzer is able to prune errors effectively, there are still a relatively large number
of remaining errors that need to be simulated, especially for the longer applications. Relyzer al-
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Figure 3.4: Effectiveness of the individual pruning techniques for (a) optimized and (b) unoptimized
applications.
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Figure 3.5: The percentage of pilots (y-axis) required to provide a desired amount of error coverage
(x-axis) for optimized applications. The x-axis shows the percentage of the total initial number of
errors that are covered by the corresponding percentage of pilots. This includes the errors from the
known-outcome category which are always considered covered. Note that the scale on the x-axis
is not linear. Only individual applications that have more than 1 million remaining (not pruned)
errors are shown, along with a curve for the aggregate errors across all applications.
lows a systematic method to trade off simulation time with coverage, revealing sweet spots that
dramatically reduce simulation time with modest reduction in coverage.
Figure 3.5 shows the percentage of pilots (y-axis) needed to provide a desired coverage of the
errors across the entire application (x-axis) after applying all pruning techniques for the optimized
applications. These pruning techniques include the known-outcome class, which is considered to
be always covered. For readability, we plot only the individual applications that had more than 1
million remaining errors that need simulation. For the full picture, we also plot the data for the
total number of errors.
It is evident from the figure that only a small fraction of the pilots cover most of the errors.
For example, 99% of all the errors across all the studied applications can be covered by 1.81% of
the pilots. This corresponds to approximately 64 million errors. We can reduce this set further
by compromising on the bit locations; e.g., injecting an error in only every eighth bit of a given
dynamic instruction, as in our validation experiments. With our existing simulation speeds, this
set of errors can be simulated in approximately 21 days on a cluster of 200 cores.
We observed similar results for unoptimized codes as well, but do not present them here because
most of the unoptimized applications we studied have under 1 million remaining errors.
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Figure 3.6: Validation of control- and store- equivalence for integer register (reg) and output latch
of address generation unit (agen) errors for optimized applications. The combined bars for each
application show the prediction rate across all error models and pruning techniques.
3.3.2 Validation of heuristics-based pruning techniques
Prediction rate for control- and store-equivalence
We validated the heuristics-based pruning techniques, namely control- and store-equivalence, for
the optimized applications as described in Section 3.2.3. Figure 3.6 shows the prediction rate of the
pilots for all twelve applications and both the studied hardware error models (integer register or reg
and output latch of address generation unit or agen). The combined bar for each application shows
the observed prediction rate across all studied error models after applying all pruning techniques.
For each application, the combined bar is the average of the prediction rate of each pruning tech-
nique and error model combination, weighted by the fraction of errors pruned by that combination.
Specifically, in addition to accounting for control- and store-equivalence, this bar also accounts for
errors pruned by def-use pruning (by associating a def-use pruned error’s prediction rate with that
of its representative errors’ rate). It also accounts for known-outcome based pruning, assuming a
100% prediction rate for that technique.
Figure 3.6 shows that the pilots selected through control-equivalence predict the outcome of their
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populations with an average (across all applications) accuracy of 95.7% for reg errors and 94.5%
for agen errors. The pilots selected by store-equivalence predict their population’s outcomes with
an average accuracy of 95.4% for reg errors and 92.6% for agen errors. The figure also shows that
for each individual application, Relyzer predicts the outcome across all error models and pruning
techniques with an accuracy of >91% (shown by the combined bar). This prediction rate averaged
across all applications is 96%.
Integer register errors observe a prediction accuracy of approximately 90% or higher for all
applications except Ocean. On the other hand, agen errors showed <90% (the lowest is about 82%)
for some cases for five applications – Blackscholes, Ocean, Gcc, Mcf, and Omnet++. We examined
a few of these cases to understand why the prediction rate was not higher, and believe many of
these can be eliminated by refining our heuristics.
For example, for Omnet++, a notable contributor to the mispredictions with control-equivalence
for agen errors was a load instruction that should have been labeled for store-equivalence pruning.
The instruction directly affected a store (and nothing else), but in the next basic block. Since our
analysis looks only within the basic block for such data dependencies to select instructions for store-
equivalence pruning, it could not find this dependency. We plan to extend our static techniques in
the future to enable correct labels in such cases.
As another example, we examined Blackscholes for store-equivalence pruning for agen errors.
The major contributor to the misprediction rate was a load instruction loading values from erroneous
addresses. In several cases, it so happened that the erroneous and correct address had the same
value; therefore, the error was masked rightaway. On the other hand, sometimes this was not the
case, and the error led to an SDC. A common pilot represented both classes of cases, leading to
mispredictions. The fundamental issue is that our heuristics do not examine the erroneous value.
For Blackscholes, we could easily modify our implementation so that during our profiling step
(error-free execution), for every potential error in a load address, we check the erroneous address
to determine if the value is different. This leads to a known-outcome based technique that can
immediately determine if such an error would be masked.
Examining the mispredicted cases in Ocean for agen errors pruned by store-equivalence exposed
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a more difficult limitation of Relyzer. A store instruction with a erroneous address was one of the
major sources of the high misprediction rate in Ocean. Such a store corrupts the intended address
by not writing the value from the source register and also the erroneous address by writing an
unintended value. We found the root cause of the misprediction to be the writing of the source
register value in the erroneous address. Since Relyzer cannot examine error propagation through
erroneous addresses, this becomes a fundamental limitation and overcoming it is an interesting
future direction.
SDC vs. non-SDC prediction rate
A key application of Relyzer is identifying SDC causing error sites; therefore, we would like to
ensure that Relyzer’s prediction rate for SDC causing errors is also high. The data in figure 3.6
showed the prediction accuracy for masked and detected errors as well. Here, we distinguish only
between SDC and non-SDC outcomes, treating the masked and detected outcomes the same. With
just the SDC and non-SDC categories in mind, we revisited the validation results in figure 3.6. We
observed that the average (across all applications) prediction rate for control-equivalence for reg
and agen errors is 96.6% and 96.2% respectively, slightly higher than the overall prediction rate
which also distinguished between the two non-SDC outcomes. Similarly, the average prediction rate
for store-equivalence for reg and agen errors is also a higher 95.9% and 94.9% respectively.
Outcomes for error injections in pilots
We next show that our choice of pilots is not biased towards any specific error outcome. We
plotted the outcomes from the error injection experiments of the pilots that were selected for vali-
dation (described in Section 3.2.3). Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of the outcomes for reg errors
in part (a) and agen errors in part (b). These two figures represent just 3,298 error injection exper-
iments. Each bar in figure 3.7 has between 129 and 320 injections for part (a) and between 27 and
102 for part (b). Even with such small sample sizes, the error outcomes have a significant fraction
of SDCs. In aggregate, about 23% of the pilots result in SDCs for both reg and agen errors. This
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Figure 3.7: Breakdown of outcomes obtained from error injections in the sampled pilots.
result indicates that Relyzer can be effective in finding SDC causing error sites.
3.4 Summary
This chapter presented Relyzer, a technique to systematically analyze all transient error injection
sites in an application. Relyzer seeks to identify all SDC causing instruction instances, both to
enable quantifying the application’s true SDC vulnerability and to motivate low cost application-
specific protection mechanisms for the desired SDC-vulnerable cases.
Relyzer employs a set of novel error pruning techniques that dramatically reduce the number
of errors (application sites) that require thorough error simulations. Relyzer predicts the out-
comes of several errors, eliminating the need for thorough error injection experiments for them. It
then exploits an observation that errors in several application error sites have similar behavior at
application-level, and develops heuristics to identify such application-level error equivalence. Re-
lyzer employs a series of static and dynamic techniques to categorize error sites into equivalence
classes, such that only one representative (pilot) error from an equivalence class needs to be thor-
oughly studied through error injection experiment. Through these techniques, we show that Relyzer
prunes the set of errors by 99.78% across twelve studied applications.
This chapter also evaluates the accuracy of the heuristics-based error pruning techniques by
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matching the results from error simulations for the pilots with results from error simulations with
samples of the represented error populations. Averaged across all the studied pruning techniques
(heuristics- and analysis-based), errors models, and applications, Relyzer correctly determined the
outcomes of 96% of the errors. Overall, Relyzer significantly reduces the application-level error
sites that require time-consuming simulations, making it feasible to study resiliency of a complete
application through a relatively small number of error injection experiments.
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Chapter 4
GangES: Reducing Error Simulation
Time
Relyzer provides a practical approach to evaluate an entire application’s resiliency. It is 2 to 6 orders
of magnitude faster than comprehensive error injection. However, Relyzer still requires significant
running time (about 4 days for our eight applications on our cluster of 172 nodes). Most of this time
(about 75%) is spent on error injections. An error error injection experiment is a time-consuming
process because it simulates the entire application from the point where the error is injected and
verifies the output by comparing it with the error-free output to categorize the outcome.
This chapter, therefore, proposes a gang error simulation framework called GangES that aims
to reduce the number of full transient error injections needed to evaluate the outcomes of Relyzer’s
pilots. GangES groups and runs multiple error simulations (of Relyzer’s pilots) and periodically
compares the state of these simulations at certain application points – those with identical states
will produce the same outcomes and only one in each such set needs to continue and complete its
full simulation. The early termination of multiple errors in a group can potentially save significant
time.
4.1 A new error simulation framework
GangES presents a systematic transient hardware error simulation techniques that takes as input
a set of errors to be simulated for an application and outputs the outcome for each error (masked,
detected, or SDC). Each error in the error set specifies a dynamic instruction instance, a hardware
resource used by that instruction instance, and the type of error to be injected in that hardware
resource for that instruction instance. In our experiments, we focus on single-bit flips in the integer
architectural registers used by the specified instruction instance (one bit flip per simulation). For
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error detection, we use detectors similar to those used in Relyzer (Section 5.2). In our experiments,
the input set of errors for GangES consists of the errors that Relyzer is not able to prune (i.e.,
the pilots of all instruction equivalence classes as categorized by Relyzer). Relyzer performs error
injections for all of these errors – for those not detected, Relyzer must execute the application to
the end and compare the output of the execution with that of the error-free execution to determine
masked or SDC outcomes (Figure 1.2).
GangES aims to reduce the overall evaluation time for its input error set by terminating as many
error simulations as possible soon after error injection and well before the end of the application
(including those simulations that would eventually be masked or SDCs). Our approach is to re-
peatedly compare execution states of a group or gang of multiple simulations in progress (hence the
name Gang Error Simulator). Any simulations in the group that reach identical states will produce
the same result and all but one of them can be terminated.
A naive implementation would compare the entire system state (processor and memory state)
at every cycle to identify the earliest point in the execution to terminate an error simulation. The
entire system state often consists of megabytes to gigabytes of data, comparing which on every
cycle can be very expensive in time. Moreover, such comparisons may not identify error masking
or equivalence effectively because even one trace of mismatch in temporarily divergent state (due
to temporarily divergent control flow) or dead values will result in non-equivalent outcome. Hence,
the challenge in developing a time-effective simulation framework for GangES is in identifying what
state to compare and when to compare.
4.1.1 What state to compare?
The state to compare at an execution point can be divided into two components – processor register
state and memory state. The size of the entire memory state at a given point in the execution is
significantly larger than the memory state relevant to the processor. Ideally, we want to identify
only the live memory state (the memory locations that will be read in the future before being
overwritten) – this is potentially much smaller than the full memory state. However, the live
memory state for different erroneous executions and for the error-free execution may be different.
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Moreover, identifying the live memory state is known to be a complex problem [35].
Our approach is to compare the memory addresses and data that are touched (written) by the
multiple error simulations. This significantly reduces the amount of memory state to compare. In
this approach, the simulations that are being compared need to start at the same execution point,
prior to error injection. Starting the simulation from the beginning of an application can result in
an unmanageable number of touched memory addresses. Hence we start the simulation only a few
instructions before the error injection point, limiting the number of touched addresses to compare.
This also allows us to save the simulation time from the beginning of the application to the point of
error injection using a single checkpointed state for the start of the simulation. Another implication
of this optimization is that we group errors that need to be injected in closeby instruction instances
together for comparison.
For processor register state, our goal is to compare live architectural registers at comparison
points. Comparing the entire register state would be fast but it may not be effective in showing
error equivalence or masking. The live register state at a given point in a program can be obtained
statically. However, an error in an execution may result in a different control flow changing the live
state for that execution. Hence, we obtain a conservative live set of registers dynamically by fast
forwarding the execution to hundreds to thousands of instructions and removing the registers that
are written before being read from the set of all the registers in this fast-forward phase.
4.1.2 When to compare executions?
For when to compare execution states, our approach is to select program locations where all ex-
ecutions would reach even if different system events take place or different branch directions are
exercised during error simulations. To select such program locations, we identify single-entry single-
exit (SESE) regions from the control flow graph of the application [25]. Formally, a SESE region is
defined as an ordered edge pair (a,b) of distinct control flow edges, a and b, where a dominates b;
i.e., every path from start to b includes a; b postdominates a; every path from a to exit includes b;
and every cycle containing a also contains b [25]. For every execution that exercises the entry edge of
a region, the exit edge will be exercised, irrespective of the data and error (assuming control follows
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the static CFG1). Therefore, for every error simulation where errors are injected in a particular
SESE region, the corresponding SESE exit edge would be exercised, providing a definite program
location to compare execution states.
Our algorithm to identify the comparison points is inspired by and similar to the SESE regions
identification algorithm by Johnson et al. [25]. They provide a linear-time algorithm for finding
SESE regions and for building a hierarchical representation of program structure based on SESE
regions called the program structure tree (PST). This algorithm works by reducing the problem to
that of determining a simple graph property called cycle equivalence: two edges are cycle equivalent
in a strongly connected component iff for all cycles C, C contains either both edges or neither
edge. They provide a fast, linear-time algorithm based on depth-first search for solving the cycle
equivalence problem, thereby finding SESE regions in linear time.
In straight-line code, the region between any two points is a SESE region; we will ignore these
regions and focus only on the block-level CFG where the straight-line code has been coalesced into
basic blocks. However, we modify the CFG to potentially obtain more comparison points for a given
error site as follows. For a basic block with multiple entry edges,2 we split it into two blocks such
that the first one with multiple entry edges has as few instructions as possible and the second block
has a single entry edge. Similarly, we also split the blocks with multiple exit edges such that the
first block has a single exit edge and the second one has the minimal instructions. We then apply
Johnson et al.’s algorithm to obtain the SESE regions [25].
For adjacent SESE regions, a and b, where the exit edge of a is the same as the entry edge of
b, we obtain c by combining a and b (which is also a SESE region).3 We then remove a and b and
add c to the list of SESE regions. This provides error simulations (in a) with more opportunity to
mask the effect of the error or become equivalent to another error injection by executing a few extra
instruction (in b). Figure 4.1 shows a CFG and the extracted SESE regions obtained by applying
the above mentioned algorithm on it.
Once all the SESE regions are obtained, which are typically nested (see Figure 4.1), they are
1If an error results in a branch to a target not specified in the CFG, our technique may be less effective but still
correct.
2Note that a basic block has a single entry instruction, but there may be multiple edges into the instruction.
3If the edge pair (p,q) is a SESE region and (q,r) is a SESE region, then (p,r) is also a SESE region.
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organized in a hierarchical representation to obtain a program structure tree (PST) using the
algorithm proposed by Johnson et al. A SESE region that immediately contains other regions is
considered parent for the containing regions (e.g., a becomes the parent for regions b and d from
Figure 4.1). We modified this tree by adding a new leaf node to SESE regions that immediately
contain non-SESE blocks. A new leaf node contains instructions that do not belong to any of its
sibling SESE regions (SESE regions that are immediately contained in its parent). For example, a
new leaf node containing instruction from blocks 1 and 16 is added to a (Figure 4.2). This modified
PST is utilized to identify next comparison points during an error simulation. By traversing up the
tree from a node where error injection is being considered, exit points of subsequent parent nodes
become the comparison points.
In the example shown in Figure 4.1, the checks for masking and equivalence to shorten the
simulations for errors in basic block numbered 3 are performed when the exit edge of the current
SESE region is exercised and when exit edges of all ancestors of the current SESE region according
to the modified PST are exercised (Figure 4.2), i.e., when edges 7→ 8, 8→ 16, and 16→ end are
exercised. Similarly, for simulations for errors in basic block 13 the checks are performed at exit
edges 14→ 15, 15→ 16, and 16→ end.
Advantage of (modified) PST: The modified PST (Figure 4.2) adds new leaf nodes that
represent non-SESE regions allowing the resiliency of the entire program to be analyzed. Every leaf
node in this modified PST can hold a resiliency summary of the program region that it represents
(a SESE or non-SESE region). These summaries, which outline the detection, masking, and SDC
rates, can then be combined with each other to obtain the summaries for every node in the tree.
The information in the root node in this PST would represent the resiliency summary of the
entire program. Resiliency summaries of the sub-blocks can be obtained by navigating the PST
downwards (a top-down approach). This can be helpful in better identifying (and perhaps ranking)
the program sections that require attention. The bottom-up approach, on the other hand, can help
in identifying the program locations where low cost detectors can be placed (i.e., finding program
locations where potentially many errors can propagate to few variables). Since the values that are
alive at SESE region exit points are potentially limited, they may be optimal points for the detector
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Figure 4.1: SESE regions. This example shows a program’s control flow graph and lists the SESE
regions (enclosed by dotted lines). The exit points of the SESE regions form the comparison points.
a 
b d 
c 
6 3 5 
e 15 
11 9 
SESE Region Other instructions 
Figure 4.2: Modified program structure tree (PST) for the CFG shown in Figure 4.1. This example
shows a hierarchical representation of nested SESE regions. It also adds new leaf nodes to non-
terminal SESE regions that contain non-SESE blocks and instructions in these non-SESE blocks
are added to the new leaf nodes.
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placement.
4.2 Methodology for GangES
Our systematic error simulation framework has two components – (1) static program structure
identification and (2) dynamic error injection and state comparison.
The error model we used injects transient errors or single bit flips in architectural integer registers
that are accessed by dynamic instructions. Since it is infeasible to inject errors in all dynamic
instructions of an application, we first applied Relyzer to significantly reduce the error sites to
evaluate but keeping the ability to reason about all application level error sites [21]. However, our
approach is applicable to any set of input error sites.
4.2.1 Static program structure identification
We implement our static program analyses at the binary level because our error model studies
errors at instruction level. We used the SPARC V9 binary analyzer we developed as described in
Section 3.2.3. This tool constructs a control flow graph from the binary and performs basic control
flow analyses. We implemented the intra-procedural SESE region identification and PST generation
algorithms (Section 4.1.2) in this infrastructure.
4.2.2 Dynamic error injection and system state comparison
Once we identify when to compare execution states, the next steps are to (1) identify when to start
an error simulation and how many simulations to group together for efficiency, (2) inject the error,
(3) collect state for comparing executions, and (4) compare simulations at the comparison points.
Figure 4.3 explains how our technique works with an example. We use Wind River Simics [59] to
implement our error injection and simulation state comparison algorithm.
Identifying when to start an error simulation and how many injections to group together: We
take several application checkpoints (using Simics’ checkpointing feature) at different points in the
application. This allows us to start simulations from intermediate execution points(À in Figure 4.3),
instead of starting from the beginning of the application for every simulation, saving running time.
52
Start from 
a checkpoint
Start of a group
SESE exit 1
SESE exit 2
SESE exit 3
Injection 1 Injection 2 Injection 3
.   .   .
X
X
X
X
=
=
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
.
.
.
Figure 4.3: Explaining how errors are simulated in GangES. This figure explains when to start
an error simulation, how many error simulation to bundle together, and what state to collect to
compare simulations at comparison points.
We identify a set of error injection sites such that all the simulations can be started from a single
stored checkpoint. Since we collect touched memory addresses from the first injection for comparison
purposes for every injection in the group, we restrict the distance between two injections and the
number of injections in each group to control the amount of data being collected. In our setup, we
only group error sites that are <100,000 instructions apart and restrict the group size to 1,000. We
observe an average group size of 327 with these parameters. We did some sensitivity analysis and
found that the average group size reduced rapidly to 100 when we lowered the maximum distance
from 100,000 to 1,000, and when we increased the maximum group size to 2,000, the average group
size increased to only 398.
Error injection: We start execution from an application checkpoint for a group of error injec-
tions sites and create a Simics bookmark4 just before the first injection point in the group (Á in
Figure 4.3). We inject errors directly into the architecture registers by flipping the bit value at the
specified error location, which is a tuple of cycle number, program counter of the instruction that
exercises the error, register operand, and bit location.
4A bookmark set at a particular point in the execution allows Simics to move the simulation to that point from
anywhere in the application, restoring the execution state at that point. This feature allows us to move backwards in
an execution.
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Collecting execution state for comparing simulations: After an error injection, we continue sim-
ulation until a comparison point, the next SESE exit, is reached. We set a breakpoint at the
program counter of the instruction that immediately follows the current SESE region’s exit edge (Â
in Figure 4.3). We also set breakpoints at the ancestor SESE region exits according to the PST (for
example, we set breakpoints at the exits of regions 3, c, b, and a while considering error injection
in region 3 from Figure 4.2). Whenever a breakpoint is reached, we remove it to avoid further in-
terrupts in the simulation (which may be caused by regions within loops) and to avoid complicated
control logic to match the program location (just the number of instances of a breakpoint activation
may not be sufficient because error may allow the program to skip or repeat some loop iterations)
for comparing states. At each comparison point, we compare the live register state and touched
memory state with other simulations that previously reached this point (example, Ä, Å, and Ç-É
in Figure 4.3). Since different error injection sites (in a group) may belong to different sub-trees in
a PST, we ensure that we only compare states when simulations reach the same program location
by comparing the program counter of the breaking instruction.
We compare live register state at every comparison point, which we obtain by listing all processor
registers, executing the next thousand instructions, and removing the registers that are written
before being read (we use the Simics bookmark utility to execute forward and return to the same
execution point). We also compare the touched memory addresses and values at a comparison
point. We observe memory operations (reads/writes) through a memory module attached to Simics
(which is added to the simulation just before the first injection, at Á in Figure 4.3). In the first
error simulation, we only collect the touched memory and live register state for future comparisons.
We continue this state collection until a fixed number of SESE exits have reached (5 in our setup)
or a threshold number of instructions have executed (100,000 in our setup5) and then continue
to the next error injection (Ã in Figure 4.3). Whenever a state match is identified (Å and É in
Figure 4.3) we terminate that simulation and declare it as equivalent to a previous simulation and
continue to the next error injection (Æ in Figure 4.3). We also terminate a simulation if an error
5We selected the threshold number of instructions such that most bundled error simulations have a memory
footprint of <2GB. For a small number of cases that exceed this limit, we adjust the threshold to 100 once this
memory limit is reached for the remaining injections in that bundle.
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Application Description Input
PARSEC 2.1
Blackscholes
Calculates prices of options with
Black-Scholes partial differential equation
sim-large
Fluidanimate
Simulates an incompressible fluid for
interactive animation purposes
sim-small
Streamcluster Solves the online clustering problem sim-small
Swaptions
Computes prices of a portfolio of
swaptions using Monte Carlo simulations
sim-small
SPLASH 2
FFT 1D Fast Fourier Transform 64K points
LU
Factors a matrix into the product of a
lower & upper triangular matrix
512× 512 matrix
16× 16 blocks
Ocean
Simulates large-scale ocean movements
based on eddy and boundary currents
258× 258 ocean
Water
Evaluates forces and potentials that occur
over time in a system of water molecules
512 molecules
Table 4.1: Applications studied for GangES
detection occurs (e.g., fatal processor exceptions, application assertion failure, application abort,
out-of-bounds access, or timeout).
4.2.3 Evaluation
We evaluate our technique using a subset of applications we used for Relyzer (Section 3.2.1). Par-
ticularly, we used eight single-threaded applications – four each from the SPLASH-2 [62] and PAR-
SEC [10] benchmark suites. Table 4.1 provides a brief description of these applications and inputs
used (which are similar to what we used earlier).
To evaluate GangES, we quantify the savings obtained by terminating the full application execu-
tions early in the error simulation framework. We obtain two quantities named sim-savings and need
full which specify the number of full simulations that were saved and the number of error injections
that need full simulation after applying the above mentioned screening technique, respectively. In
cases where equivalence was showed between simulations, we also measure when the equalization
occurred.
4.3 Results for GangES
After employing Relyzer, 1.08 million application error sites needed simulation for our workloads,
which required approximately 12,600 hours of running time to perform error injection experiments
(approximately 3 days on our cluster of 172 compute nodes). To reduce the evaluation time and
the number of full simulations, we employ GangES.
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Figure 4.4: Effectiveness of GangES in reducing the total wall clock time needed for error simulations
and the number of full error simulations. For each application, the bars in Figure (a) show the total
wall-clock time needed for simulating all Relyzer-identified errors, GangES framework, and the time
spent in simulating errors that need full executions (after GangES). The bars in Figure (b) show
the fraction of error simulations that GangES identifies as detections, that were saved from full
execution (i.e., terminated early due to a state match with another execution), and that needed full
simulation (need full).
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Figure 4.4(a) shows the effectiveness of GangES. For each application, it first shows the baseline,
which is the time needed for simulating Relyzer’s errors. It also shows the time consumed by GangES
in identifying which simulations need full simulations (GangES overhead) and the time that was
needed to run such simulations to completion (need full). This figure shows that we obtain high
simulation time savings of 51% on average across our workloads. These savings translate to hundreds
of hours of simulation time savings for all our workloads (ranging from 231 hours for Blackscholes
to 2,170 hours for Fluidanimate). This figure also shows that GangES consumes a small fraction of
the total simulation time (only 170 hours for all our workloads together).
In Figure 4.4(b), we show the fraction of the total error simulations that result in a detection
(these would be terminated early regardless of GangES), that were saved from full execution, and
that need full simulation (need full). On average, approximately 35% of the total error simulations
were saved; i.e., they were shown equivalent to another execution, saving the simulation time of
running them to completion and comparing their output to the error-free output. Overall, 47% of
the total input error set required full simulation.
Figure 4.5 shows when the equalization was performed for the saved simulations (from Fig-
ure 4.4(b)). It shows that on average about 94% of saved simulations were terminated at the
first SESE region exit from the point of error injection. Approximately 5% and 1% of the saved
simulations were equalized at the second and third SESE exits respectively.
Figure 4.6 shows the average distance in the number of executed instructions from the point
of error injection to the simulation state equalization (at a SESE exit). Specifically, it shows that
the average distance to first successful comparison (averaged across our applications) is approxi-
mately 2,850 instructions (where 94% of saved simulations are equalized). Distance to successful
comparisons varied significantly with applications because the comparison points are identified ac-
cording to the PST, which is application-specific. The average distance to successful comparison
at the kth exit can be smaller than that of the qth, where k > q, because varying number of simu-
lations from different procedures reach different SESE exits (note our PST generating algorithm is
intra-procedural).
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Figure 4.5: The SESE exit where the saved simulations (from Figure 4.4(b)) are equalized. As an
example, 94% of saved simulations are shown equivalent to some other simulation at the first SESE
exit.
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Figure 4.6: Distance of the successful comparison point (categorized by SESE region exit number)
from the point of error injection.
Figure 4.7 explains why the simulations categorized as need full in Figure 4.4(b) were not equal-
ized to other simulations. We categorize these simulations based on the following criteria: (1)
Register state mismatched at all exercised SESE exits (Reg Only), (2) Register state matched but
memory state mismatched at all exercised SESE exits (Mem Only), (3) Combination of categories
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(1) and (2) occurred at different SESE exits, i.e., register state mismatched at some SESE exits and
when it matched the memory state did not match (Reg+Mem), (4) No comparison was performed
prior to a threshold number of instructions6 executed (Timeout). From Figure 4.4(b), we observed
that Ocean requires the highest number of full simulations, requiring 61% of all the simulations to
be run until completion. From Figure 4.7, we note that over 58% of simulations that were marked as
need full were never compared to any other simulation for Ocean. Hence, we need to identify more
reachable comparison points and a compact way to store simulation state to allow more compar-
isons to increase the savings of GangES. Increasing our threshold for comparison should allow more
comparison points and employing compression or encoding techniques should lower the simulation
state storage overhead. These alternatives are a subject of our future research.
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Figure 4.7: Categorizing the errors that need full simulations based on whether register state,
memory state, or both mismatched during comparisons or no comparison was made before timeout
condition was met.
We also evaluated the sensitivity of comparing all registers vs. live registers at SESE exits
by observing the impact on the savings obtained by GangES (Figure 4.8). Recall that we fast
forward 1000 instructions to obtain a conservative live processor register state at a comparison
point (Figure 4.3). When we disallowed this step and compared all processor registers, the average
wall clock time needed for GangES and full simulations increased to 911 hours from 764 hours for
6Recall that we use 100,000 as the default threshold. However, once the memory footprint of the executing bundled
simulation exceeds 2GB, we adjust the threshold to 100 for the remaining injections in that bundle.
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our workloads, reducing the average amount of simulation time savings to 42% (from 51%). This
clearly shows that comparing live processor registers provides significant simulation savings over
comparing all registers.
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Figure 4.8: Amount of time needed by GangES and error simulations that need full executions
when all processor registers were compared at SESE exits (vs. comparing just the live registers at
these exit points) is shown here.
4.4 Summary
Relyzer provides a practical approach to evaluate an entire application’s resiliency. It employs
simple dynamic analyses to predict error behavior and shows equivalence between several error
sites. It then performs error injections on the remaining sites to obtain a complete application
resiliency profile. This approach is practical but it still requires significant error simulation time to
obtain an application’s resiliency profile.
This chapter presents a gang error simulator called GangES, as a performance enhancement
mechanism for Relyzer, that aims to significantly reduce the error simulation time needed to eval-
uate the outcomes of Relyzer’s pilots. GangES bundles multiple error simulations together and
periodically compares states to identify similarities between executions to allow early termination,
saving significant evaluation time. Identifying when to compare executions and what state to com-
pare is challenging because instruction sequences can be different between multiple error simulations
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and comparing the entire system state can be expensive in time, respectively. To overcome this
challenge, we leverage the static structure of a program, identify single-entry single-exit (SESE)
regions, and use SESE region exit edges as comparison points. This approach provides limited and
effectively spaced comparison points. We compare a small amount of system state comprising of
live processor registers and limited touched memory addresses at these comparison points.
Our results show that after applying GangES, only 47% of the error simulations originally
identified by Relyzer required running the application to completion and the checking the output to
determine the fault outcome. 94% of the error simulations that were terminated early by GangES
required an average of only 2,850 instructions to be executed before termination. Overall, we found
that GangES replaced Relyzer’s error simulation time of approximately 12,600 hours with a total
time of 6,110 hours, providing a wall-clock time savings of 51.5% for our workloads and error model.
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Chapter 5
Low Cost Program-level Detectors
and Tuning SDC Reduction1
Since Relyzer significantly reduced the number of errors that require detailed error injection ex-
periments for complete resiliency analysis, we performed error injections in the remaining sites and
obtained a list of virtually all SDC-causing instructions in an application. In this chapter, we present
an analysis of these SDC-causing program locations and the low cost selective program-level error
detectors, we developed, that were are shown to be effective in reducing SDCs. Since hardware and
software architects continuously trade off performance, power, and resiliency to meet ever increasing
design constraints, developing a low cost error detection mechanism without providing the flexibility
to balance costs is not sufficient.
Relyzer, for the first time, enables tuning resiliency by identifying virtually all SDC-vulnerable
program locations. This allows architects to target any resiliency budget by protecting just the
desired set of vulnerable program locations. Utilizing this approach we achieved the ability to obtain
a set of near-optimal detectors for any SDC coverage target.2 This allowed us to obtain continuous
SDC coverage vs. performance trade-off curves. We present this approach (as the second application
of Relyzer) and our results in this chapter.
Investigating the SDC-causing error sites revealed that only a small fraction of static instructions
cause most SDCs. Figure 5.1(a) shows that virtually all the SDCs for the studied applications were
caused by just 20.6% of the static instructions on average; 90% of the SDCs were caused by a mere
5.4% of the static instructions. (We only considered errors in integer register operands of executing
instruction in our work and Section 5.2 provides the detailed methodology for these results.) This
observation motivates using selective instruction-level detection techniques. Prior work has made
1Most of the text, figures, and tables in this chapter are taken from the original publication [20] and are copyrighted
by IEEE.
2SDC coverage is defined as the fraction of SDCs converted to detections.
62
010
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
 S
ta
ti
c
 I
n
s
tr
u
c
ti
o
n
s
 
% SDCs 
Blackscholes
FFT
Libquantum
LU
Swaptions
Water
Geomean
(a)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
 E
x
e
c
u
ti
o
n
 T
im
e
 
% SDCs 
Blackscholes
FFT
Libquantum
LU
Swaptions
Water
Geomean
(b)
Figure 5.1: SDC-causing instructions and their impact on execution time. For a given applica-
tion and input, part (a) shows the percentage of (executed) static instructions that cause a given
percentage of silent data corruptions (SDCs). Part (b) shows the fraction of execution time (on
a 1 IPC machine) taken by the static instructions in part (a) (for the given percentage of SDCs).
For example, in FFT, 2% of the static instructions cause 60% of the SDCs and take 21% of the
execution time. (The detailed methodology is in Section 5.2.)
similar observations, but has used selective instruction-level redundancy for detection [16, 50, 51].
Figure 5.1(b) shows the execution time (in number of dynamic instructions) consumed by the
static instructions that cause SDCs. We find that the small fraction of SDC-causing static instruc-
tions consume a much higher fraction of the execution time. The figure shows that protecting all
SDC-causing instructions through instruction-level redundancy may incur 50% overhead on aver-
age, assuming a conservative one cycle overhead per covered instruction (33% overhead on average
for covering 90% of the SDCs). This high overhead is consistent with that reported for previous
selective instruction-based redundancy techniques [16], and motivates selective detection techniques
that are much more cost effective than instruction-level redundancy.
Hence with the goal of reducing and possibly eliminating the reliance on instruction-level re-
dundancy, we next focus on finding alternate low cost program-level error detectors. Our approach
is to move up from the instruction-level to understand the program behaviors and properties that
are responsible for producing SDCs.
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5.1 Analyzing SDC-causing program sections and developing
program-level detectors
We first analyze the list of the SDC-causing error sites. We sort the SDC-causing static instructions
in decreasing order of the number of SDCs they can produce, and analyze them in that order. For
each instruction, we inspect the disassembled binary code around it to associate an application code
(C code) section with it.3 To our surprise, we observed a few code properties appearing repeatedly
across different locations in the same application and even across different applications.
Given the SDC-causing sites, the next goal is to identify where to place the detectors and what
detectors to use. For placement (where), the program locations should be selected such that many
errors propagate to these points in a few variables. We used the end of loops and function calls that
contain the SDC-causing instructions. For the detectors (what), we exploit a range of program-level
properties: (1) comparing similar computations, (2) checking value equality, (3) range checks, and
(4) performing mathematical tests. While devising these program-level detectors, we also ensure
that they are low cost.
Our approach of placing the detectors at the end of loops and function calls can potentially
increase detection latencies because the errors are allowed to propagate until a detection point. A
further exploration of the relationship between such detection latencies and recovery is left to future
work.
The rest of this section describes the program code sections that we identified as SDC prone
with examples, and explains the low cost program-level detectors we devised to detect SDCs in
these code sections using the above mentioned insights.
5.1.1 Incrementalization in loops
We observed that a significant fraction of SDC-causing error sites directly affect computations
in loops. These application sites often correspond to the loop index variables and/or addresses
referring to array elements that are accessed in every loop iteration. For example, Figure 5.2(a)
3Compiler optimizations often make a direct association harder. However, we were able to identify the section of
application code that contains the instruction of interest in most cases.
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and (c) give the source and compiled code respectively for a single loop in the LU application from
the SPLASH2 benchmark suite. Almost all instructions operating on integer registers in this code
section were listed high in the sorted list of SDC-causing error sites.4 In particular, these errors
alone produced over 50% of all the SDCs in LU. Faults in this compiled code can result in SDCs
in the following two ways: (1) An error affecting i can either terminate the loop early or cause it
to go back in the iteration space. Since there is no loop-carried dependence, the latter effect will
always result in masking the error. (2) Faults in addresses A and B can result in detection if the
erroneous address is unallocated. If the erroneous address points to a valid but incorrect memory
location then the error may be masked or result in an SDC. In this scenario, we observed that
errors in several low-order bits in A and B resulted in SDCs because erroneous addresses pointed
to incorrect locations in arrays a and b.
Analyzing this code further, we observe that it uses the loop incrementalization optimization [31].
This optimization is typically applied on programs that perform computations on array elements
in loops. Addresses to access these array elements must be computed in every iteration. This can
be expensive if computed from scratch from the initial value (involving a multiplication and an
addition). Modern compilers, therefore, apply the loop incrementalization optimization where the
new value of the address is computed from the value in the previous iteration, involving just an
addition. This optimization is shown to produce significant performance benefits for array-based
codes [31]. Figure 5.2(b) and (c) show the assembly codes without and with the incrementalization
optimization respectively for the C code shown in Figure 5.2(a).
Detecting errors in incrementalized loops: Incrementalization makes errors in index variables
and addresses used to access array elements propagate until the end of the loop. Hence, a property
check at this location on these accumulated quantities can detect errors impacting these variables
across all the iterations of this loop. Often the incrementalization in a loop is performed on multiple
variables such that they all are incremented in every loop iteration with a value that is constant
across iterations. We utilize this inherently similar computation to derive a property check at the
end of the loop.
4Our error model (explained in Section 5.2) considers errors only in integer architecture register operands of
executing dynamic instructions.
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for (i=0; i<n; i++) 
    a[i] = a[i] + (alpha * b[i]); 
(a) C code (c) Optimized code 
      A = base address of array a 
      B = base address of array b 
 
L1: Load  f1 ← [B] 
      Multiply f2 = alpha, f1 
      Load  f3 ← [A] 
      Fadd f4 = f3 + f2 
      Store f4 → [A] 
      Add  B = B + 0x8 
      Add  A = A + 0x8 
      Add  i = i + 1 
      Compare i, n 
      Branch less than L1 
      nop 
(b) Code without incrementalization 
      A = base address of array a 
      B = base address of array b 
 
L1: Multiply offset = i, 0x8 
      Add  B’ = B + offset 
      Add  A’ = A + offset 
      Load  f1 ← [B’] 
      Multiply f2 = alpha, f1 
      Load  f3 ← [A’] 
      Fadd f4 = f3 + f2 
      Store f4 → [A’] 
      Add  i = i + 1 
      Compare i, n 
      Branch less than L1 
      nop 
A_init = A 
B_init = B 
i_init = i 
Assert (A-A_int == B-B_init) 
Assert ((B-B_init)/8 == i-i_int) 
 
Assembly equilvalent: 
   A1 = A - A_init 
   B1 = B - B_init 
   i = i - i_init 
   compare A1, B1 
   Branch.ne FaultDetected  
   B2 = B1 / 0x8 
   compare i, B2 
   Branch.ne FaultDetected 
(d) Extra code for detectors 
Figure 5.2: An “SDC-hot” code section with loop incrementalization in LU from the SPLASH2
benchmark suite: (a) C code, (b) unoptimized assembly without loop incrementalization, (c) opti-
mized assembly with loop incrementalization, and (d) detector for the optimized code. Faults in this
(optimized) loop alone produce >50% of all SDCs in LU. The extra code in part (d) detects errors
affecting i, A, and B in the optimized code. Initial values of these registers are collected at the
beginning of the loop. These values are later used at the end of the loop to test the program-level
properties.
Figure 5.2(d) shows such a detector for our LU example. First, the initial values of A, B,
and i are copied into different registers (or predefined memory locations). If the initial value of a
register is predetermined as a constant then we can skip this step. For example, we do not have to
collect the initial value of i because it is always 0. The values A and B are incremented with the
same constant value in all the iterations. Hence the difference between their final and initial values
should be the same. This property check can detect all single-event-upsets in these variables in all
iterations of the loops. A similar check for variable i can also be performed by accounting for the
different amount of increments used for i and A or B (also shown in Figure 5.2(d)). Since these
detectors do not compromise coverage, we call them “lossless.”
Codes that do not use the incrementalization optimization may produce intermediate values
(offset, A′, and B′) in every loop iteration as shown in Figure 5.2(b). Since errors affecting these
intermediate values do not propagate to the end of the loop in a few variables, deriving a low cost
error detector is hard for non-incrementalized versions.
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5.1.2 Registers with long life
We observed that a sizable chunk of SDCs were caused by errors in registers with long life, with
multiple uses through this life. For example, we observed that the register holding the value n
in Figure 5.2(c) is SDC prone. This register stays alive until the end of the loop and is used in
every iteration of the loop. Other prominent examples are the registers that hold stack and frame
pointers. These registers are typically set at the beginning of a function call and stay alive until
the last instruction in the function body is executed.
Detecting errors in a register with long life: Errors in such a register remain alive until the
end of the life of the register. Hence, the location to place a detector is, trivially, just after the
last use of this register. If the register is used in many instructions through its life, then the cost
of the detector is amortized across all of those uses. For this detector, we first attempt to identify
another register or a constant such that its value can be compared to our target register. If this
attempt fails, then we record the register’s initial value (created at the definition of this register)
in a different register (or a predefined memory location). At the detection location, we compare
the initial value with the latest value in the register. An example of this is detecting errors in the
register that stores the value of n in Figure 5.2(c). The value of n at the end of the loop can be
tested with its earlier recorded value (from the beginning of the loop or its definition point). These
detectors, like the previous ones, are also “lossless.”
5.1.3 Application-specific behavior
For some applications, a large chunk of the SDC-causing error sites belong to a few procedures.
These procedures often do not have any side effects; i.e., the only output of the procedure is
the return value. The exponential function from the math library, the BitReverse function from
the FFT application from the SPLASH2 benchmark suite, and the RanUnif function (uniform
random number generator) from the Swaptions application from the Parsec benchmark suite are
few examples.
Detecting errors in the exponential function: A significant fraction of SDC-causing sites
in Blackscholes and Water from Parsec and SPLASH2 benchmark suites respectively belong to the
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exponential function. The output of this function depends only on the input and no other previously
stored data. All the errors created by the static error sites in this function body, therefore, propagate
through the output at the end of this function. We therefore place our detector at the end of the
function.
Naively testing the output for correctness at this location can be expensive due to the nature of
the function. We utilized a basic mathematical property of this function such that the errors can
propagate through accumulating quantities over different invocations. This allows us to perform
the test infrequently and still cover all the error sites in these invocations.
From the definition of the exponential function, we know that exp(i1+i2) = exp(i1)×exp(i2) and
exp(i1 − i2) = exp(i1) ÷ exp(i2), where i1 and i2 are inputs and exp(i1) and exp(i2) are outputs
of two invocations respectively. This property allows us to accumulate inputs using addition or
subtraction and outputs using multiplication or division respectively. To detect errors, we re-execute
this function with the accumulated input and compare its result with the accumulated output. The
cost of this re-execution will be amortized across several invocations of this function. To detect
errors in tolerable latencies, the frequency of the invocation of this detector can be dictated by the
recovery solution (by specifying the tolerable detection latency).
Since a floating point operation on all hardware inherently generates an error and the exponential
function on large or small inputs can exacerbate this error, we decided to apply this test only on
relatively smaller inputs; i.e., when the absolute value of the input is < 25. For the remaining inputs,
we rely on redundancy. We observed that very few invocations in our applications use inputs that
are ≤ -25 and ≥ 25. Moreover, we use a combination of addition and subtraction on input such that
the absolute value of the accumulated input is closer to zero and accordingly we use multiplication
or division to accumulate output. This detector may show a loss in detection coverage if the error
caused by the error is within the estimated precision error of the floating point operations. We
therefore call this detector “lossy.”
Detecting errors in BitReverse function: In the FFT application from the SPLASH2 bench-
mark suite, nearly half of the SDC-causing sites belong to a function called BitReverse. This
function takes an integer value as input and reverses its bits in the boolean representation. For
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C code 
 
KC=0; 
for (K = 0; K < 9; K++) { 
 Some computation 
 if (condition) 
  KC++; 
} Assert (KC ≤ 9) 
Assert (K == 9) 
Extra code 
Figure 5.3: A detector for a register with a fixed
upper bound. The figure shows a code section
from the Water application. Faults affecting
this code eventually corrupt the value of KC
and produce SDCs. The assertions show how
these errors can be detected.
for (i=0; i<n; i++) { 
 a[i].state ^= (1<<target ) 
      } 
      A = address of array a[0].state 
      Shift left l7 = 1 << target 
L1: Load l1 ← [A] 
      Xor l2 = l1 ^  l7 
      Store l2 → [A] 
      Add A = A + 0x10 
      Add i = i + 1 
      Compare i, n 
      Branch less than L1 
      nop 
 
  Sethi   hi(0x100000), l1 
  Or  l1 = l1 | 0x4 
  Shift left  l2 = l1 << 0xc 
  Load  l3 ← [l2 + 0x5c8] 
 
 
  Load l3 ← [0x1000045c8] 
 
(a)  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
(b) 
C code Assembly code 
Figure 5.4: SDCs due to local computations:
Faults in short-lived registers, l1 and l2, produce
non-negligible fraction of SDCs. (a) Code from
the Libquantum application. (b) Instructions
generated by the Sun cc compiler to compute a
static address.
example, if the input is 3 (0011), a 4-bit value, then the output should be 12 (1100).
The output of this function depends only on the input and no other previously stored data.
Hence all the errors generated within this function body propagate through the output at the end
of this function making it an ideal location for detector placement. Since this procedure does not
show any accumulating behavior, we resort to checking parity on both the input and output. Since
they both have the same number of bits set, the computed parities should match and detect errors
that makes output and input differ by an odd number of bits. Naive software implementation for
parity generation, however, can be expensive. One of the most optimized ways is to compute it in
parallel [1]. Another way is to use the parity flag in Intel 64 architectures [3] that is generated on
every logical and arithmetic operation on the low-order byte of the result. These implementations
take <10 instructions to compute the parity of a 32-bit value (Exact implementations can be found
in [20]). This detector may lose coverage if the corrupted output has a multi-bit error, and is
therefore “lossy.”
Detecting errors affecting registers with a fixed upper bound: A significant number of
SDCs in the Water application from SPLASH2 were generated by errors in the variable KC in the
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code segment shown in Figure 5.3. To detect errors affecting the variables K and KC (directly
and/or indirectly) in different iterations of this loop, we placed a detector at the end of the loop.
From this code, it is evident that KC ≤ 9 and K = 9 hold at the end of loop; we therefore used
these invariants as detectors. Since all errors affecting K cannot be detected by testing KC ≤ 9
alone, we also add K = 9 to the detector. Faults that affect KC alone (without corrupting K)
such that KC ≤ 9 may remain undetected. Since a loss in detection coverage can be observed, this
detector is again “lossy.”
Detecting errors in the random number generator from Swaptions: Over 90% of the
SDCs in the Swaptions applications from the Parsec suite were caused just by a uniform random
number generator function. This function takes a seed as the input and performs a series of integer
operations to update the seed. This updated value is then used to generate the random number
which ranges between 0 and 1. Since errors always propagate through the output, we place the
detector at the end of this function call and it tests whether the output follows the specification;
i.e., 0 ≤ output ≤ 1. Since this detector cannot detect all the errors affecting the output of this
function, it is “lossy.”
5.1.4 Local computations or registers with short life
We observed that a non-negligible fraction of SDCs were caused by errors in local computations
with short register data flow chains. One example of this scenario is shown in Figure 5.4(a).
Registers l1 and l2 store intermediate results and have short lives. Faults affecting these registers
eventually corrupt the values stored in memory locations pointed by A. Another example of this
pattern is the sequence of instructions that compute the static addresses known at compile time. In
SPARC V9 systems (our target machine), the global data section is stored above 1GB point in the
virtual address space layout [5] and hence addresses of global variables require >32 bits. Multiple
instructions are needed to generate these addresses because the ISA lacks instructions that can
move constants of required sizes of >32 bits directly.
Since errors in the locally computed values do not propagate to a few values at an easily iden-
tifiable location in the program, deriving detectors and placing them for cost-effective detection is
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hard. Hence, we rely on instruction-level redundancy for these computations.
5.2 Experimental methodology
We analyzed application resiliency by performing error injection experiments in the error sites that
are selected by Relyzer (Section 3). For our error model, we consider transient errors or single
bit flips in every bit in each integer architecture register operand (one at a time) of executing
instructions. Since this error model considers error sites that are highly likely to be architecturally
live, it inherently filters a large fraction of masked errors (errors that do not affect application
output). This allows us to focus more on errors that impact application output (and potentially
cause SDCs).
We selected a mix of six applications from the SPLASH2 [62], Parsec [10], and SPEC CPU2006
[24] benchmark suites for this study (Blackscholes, FFT, Libquantum, LU, Swpations, and Water
from Table 3.1). All the selected applications were compiled using Sun C/C++ compiler version
5.9 with the highest level of optimization. We performed error injections such that 99% of all the
error sites were analyzed (as reported by Relyzer). Overall we performed 890,000 error injections
across all the studied applications. These experiments were completed in approximately 3 days on
a cluster of 175 compute nodes. The error injection framework used in this evaluation is similar to
the one described in Section 3.2.2.
5.2.1 Detectors and overhead evaluations
We implemented our program-level detectors (described in Section 5.1) in Simics using breakpoints.
Simics provides a framework to set breakpoints on various processor events and perform desired
computations on these events. Our program-level detectors usually have two parts - one for collect-
ing the information (typically at the beginning of loops or functions) and the other for executing a
specified check. At these points, we also collect information needed to measure the execution over-
heads. We measure the overheads in terms of the increase in the number of dynamic instructions.
Table 5.1 shows the number of instructions we add to the application’s total number of dynamic
instructions on every invocation of collection or testing point of a detector. We measure the over-
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heads for instruction-level redundancy by estimating that one instruction can be protected by one
extra instruction even though the requirement is often more.
5.2.2 Evaluating the lossy detectors
The expected coverage of a detector is obtained by analyzing SDC causing sites and checking whether
the detector can catch errors originating from these sites. Since the actual coverage observed by
the lossy detectors may differ from the expected coverage, their effectiveness must be evaluated
experimentally. Hence we performed a statistical error injection campaign for the error sites that
are expected to be covered by these detectors. Overall we performed approximately 10,000 injections
such that the error bars on our results are < 2.8% at 99% confidence level.
5.2.3 Determining the lowest overhead detectors for a target SDC coverage
Our detectors from Section 5.1 coupled with instruction-level redundancy-based detectors provide
a range of choices to achieve a given SDC coverage (fraction of SDCs detected). We would like
to determine the lowest overhead set of detectors for each target SDC coverage, and understand
the consequent trade-off between execution overhead and SDC coverage. Such SDC coverage vs.
overhead curves also enable a fair comparison with instruction-level redundancy based detectors.
To generate the above curves, we used a dynamic programming algorithm similar to one that
solves the 0-1 knapsack problem. We start by labeling all (mutually exclusive) detectors of interest
(redundancy based and/or our program-level detectors) with the fraction of SDCs they cover and
their execution overheads (as discussed in Section 5.2.1). We then run the optimization algorithm
to find the combination of detectors with the minimum combined overhead with a constraint that
the sum of the SDC coverage provided is at least equal to the target.
We generate execution overhead vs. SDC coverage curves for different classes of detectors:
instruction-level redundancy only, our lossless detectors, and our lossless+lossy detectors. For the
last two curves, some SDC causing static instructions of an application may not be covered (or
may be only partially covered) by our program-level detectors. We therefore add instruction-level
redundancy-based detectors for those static instructions to our dynamic programming problem.
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Operations Estimated
number of
instrns.
Collecting
a reg value
reg′ = reg 1
Lossless
detectors
r1− r1′ == r2− r2′ 4
(r1− r1′)/const == r2− r2′ 5
(r1− r1′)/r3 == r2− r2′ 5
r1 == r2 2
r1 == const 2
r1 == r2− const 3
Lossy
detectors
r1 ≤ const 2
Testing BitReverse functionality 20
Accumulated check for 20
exp function
Range checking for RandUnif 4
0 ≤ reg ≤ 1
Table 5.1: Extra instructions used for measuring execution overhead
For the partially covered static instructions, the SDC coverage assigned to the redundancy based
detectors (for the purposes of our optimization algorithm) is the number of SDCs not covered by
our detectors. For the lossless+lossy curves, the dynamic programming algorithm assumes there
is no coverage loss in the lossy detectors when determining which redundancy based detectors to
consider (but the SDC coverage attributed to the lossy detectors when plotting the curves does take
into account the loss using the method in Section 5.2.2). Thus, these curves may still terminate
without covering all SDCs. Finally, the overall optimal solution for a target SDC coverage is to
select the set of detectors that incur the least execution overhead among the above three trade-off
curves.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Sources of SDCs
For reference, Figure 5.5 shows the absolute SDC rates obtained by our Relyzer-driven error injection
experiments as described in Section 5.2. The SDC rates of our applications range between 8% to
32%. These are much higher than prior evaluations [28, 46], primarily because of the difference
in the error model. Our error model considers errors in only those architectural registers that are
highly likely to be alive, whereas prior work uses microarchitecture (and lower) level error models
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Figure 5.5: Baseline absolute SDC rates. These absolute rates are higher than previously reported
for symptom-based detectors [28, 46], largely because of the different error models used.
Applications
Num
app.
locations
Lossless Lossy
Loop Long lived App.
based reg. based specific
Blackscholes 2 4 4 1
FFT 10 15 12 1
Libquantum 10 8 18
LU 13 12 16
Swaptions 9 12 5 1
Water 15 13 17 2
Table 5.2: Number of detectors placed in the static application code
which have a much higher masking rate [28, 26]. We chose the higher level error model because our
focus is on uncovering all possible SDCs with as few error injections as possible and then reducing
those SDCs. While we report the absolute SDC rate here for reference, the rest of this section
focuses on the fraction of the baseline SDCs that are detected by our detectors (or SDC coverage).
To understand where in the program the SDC causing instructions come from, Figure 5.6 cate-
gorizes them based on the code patterns we identified in Section 5.1. Figure 5.6 shows this catego-
rization. We observe that error sites that correspond to registers with long life and incrementalized
loops produce a significant fraction of SDCs for FFT, Libquantum, LU, and Water (>90% of SDCs
in Libquantum and LU). Application-specific behavior was a major contributor for Blacksholes,
FFT, Swaptions, and Water. The figure shows that only a small fraction of SDC producing error
sites (up to 11.5%) were either categorized as local computations or not categorized at all (labeled
as others in the figure) for all applications. This indicates that our detectors can potentially cover
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Figure 5.6: Contribution of code patterns from Section 5.1 to SDCs.
a large fraction of SDCs.
5.3.2 Static overhead of the program-level detectors
Table 5.2 shows the program-level detectors placed in the static code for our applications. The
second column shows the number of static application locations where our detectors were placed.
The remaining columns show the number of detectors placed for covering errors in incrementalized
loops, registers with long life, and application specific behavior. The sum of the last three columns
may not add up to the value in the second column because multiple detectors can be placed in one
static code location. The relatively small number of static code locations that require modifications
shows that our devised detectors are not intrusive on the application. Moreover, the small number
of application specific detectors means that limited program knowledge is required to implement
them. This reinforces the benefit of Relyzer in pinpointing the SDC-vulnerable code sections that
need examination.
5.3.3 SDC coverage of the program-level detectors
Since the program-level detectors were placed based on the SDC vulnerability of the error sites, the
corresponding reduction in the SDCs (SDC coverage) is known a priori, assuming that the added
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detectors are perfect. Thus, for the lossless detectors, the corresponding areas marked in Figure 5.6
(incrementalized loops and registers with long life) directly give the SDC coverage. We observe that
on average, these detectors alone provide an SDC coverage of 50%. These detectors do not need
further evaluation – they are sound and do not compromise coverage of their corresponding SDC
sites.
Figure 5.6 shows that the application specific or lossy detectors also potentially cover a significant
fraction of SDCs. Since these detectors can observe a coverage loss, their actual SDC coverage cannot
be derived from their area in Figure 5.6. Instead we use a statistical error injection campaign as
explained in Section 5.2.2. Our detectors for the exponential function, BitReverse function, values
with upper bounds, and uniform random number generator show a coverage loss of 16%, 27%, 3%,
and 33% respectively, relative to their expected or potential coverage indicated by Figure 5.6. For
errors in the exponential function, we observed that most of the undetected errors produced outputs
that could be tolerated by the application. For the random number generator, we observed that
for our input set, the number of iterations of the corresponding Monte Carlo simulation executed
is small and not yet convergent; preliminary experiments showed that with a large enough number
of iterations, the errors may be tolerated in this case as well. In this work, however, we treat all
undetected errors that result in output deviation as loss in coverage.
Figure 5.7 shows the total actual SDC coverage of our program-level detectors, combining both
the lossy and lossless detectors. The figure shows that our detectors are highly successful, converting
67-92% of the original SDCs into detections (average of 84%), with both the lossy and lossless
detectors contributing significantly.
5.3.4 Execution overhead from the program-level detectors
Figure 5.8 shows the runtime overheads of our program-level detectors, separating the contributions
from the lossy and lossless detectors. The overheads range from 0.08% to 18%, with an average of
10%.
The largest overheads come from the lossy application-specific detectors. Specifically, the expo-
nential function in Blackscholes and the BitReverse function in FFT take the overheads for these
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Figure 5.7: SDC coverage obtained by our
program-level detectors, separated into coverage
from the lossless and lossy detectors.
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Figure 5.8: Execution overheads incurred by the
program-level detectors, separated into coverage
from the lossless and lossy detectors. The over-
head of LU can be lowered to 3.4% with a small
change in an input parameter without loss of per-
formance or SDC coverage.
applications to over 10%. Libquantum, Swaptions, and Water see much lower overheads of under
10%. Libquantum in particular sees almost zero overhead because of its use of loop-based detectors
placed at the end of long running loops.
Although LU shows an overhead of 12.57%, a closer look showed that it can be lowered signifi-
cantly. One of the loop based detectors (shown in Figure 5.2) executes with high frequency because
the loop terminates after a small number of iterations (16 in particular). The number of iterations
of this loop is dictated by a parameter that controls the block-size used by the blocking optimiza-
tion for improving the effectiveness of memory hierarchies. This parameter can be increased to 64
on modern processors without any loss of performance [10]. When we deployed our detectors on
this application with the block-size parameter set to 64, we observed that the overheads reduced
to a much lower 3.24%. Since all the detectors used in this application are lossless, there is no
compromise on SDC coverage with this modification.
5.3.5 SDC coverage vs. execution overheads
Figure 5.9 plots, for each application, SDC coverage vs. execution overhead trade-off curves for
different classes of detectors: instruction-based redundancy, lossless program-level, lossless+lossy
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Figure 5.9: SDC coverage vs. execution overhead for each application for different classes of detec-
tors.
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program-level, and optimal that combines the best of the above. For LU, the figure also shows a
curve for the version with the block size of 64 (using the same SDC profile as for the base LU since
the application binary and inputs other than block size are unchanged). The methodology used is
as described in Section 5.2.3. In particular, the curves for program-level detectors add (selective)
instruction-level redundancy for the SDC targets they cannot otherwise reach. The above curves
serve two purposes: (1) they provide a fair way to compare the redundancy based and program-level
detectors by allowing overhead comparisons for a fixed SDC coverage target and (2) they enable
programmers and system designers to systematically trade off SDC coverage and performance.
The graphs show that our program-level detectors can reduce overhead relative to instruction-
level redundancy alone at all target SDC coverage points for most of the applications. Focusing
on Libquantum and LU, which do not use lossy detectors, we observe that in both cases, the
overhead reduction relative to redundancy-only is quite high for the most part. The gains for LU
are magnified when a larger block size of 64 is used (the “LU-64 lossless” curve). For Libquantum,
the program-level detectors see near zero overheads to cover up to 91% of the SDCs. For both
applications, the optimal curves fully overlap the program-level detector (lossless) curves.
Among the applications that use lossy detectors, all but Swaptions see significant overhead
improvements for most of the interesting SDC coverage targets. In Blackscholes, the lossless+lossy
curve shows a step behavior at 25% SDC coverage because the detector used to cover the SDCs
in the exponential function with overhead of about 18% was required to achieve the target SDC
coverage. This detector could have potentially capped the overhead for high SDC coverage points
but its lossy behavior limited its coverage.
For FFT and Water, the use of the lossy detectors along with the lossless ones consistently
provided lower execution overheads than lossless detectors alone. In Swaptions, the simple lossy
detector provides a low cost alternative to redundancy up to an SDC coverage of up to 70%. For
higher coverage the optimal solution was, however, to use redundancy for the most part. The lossless
detectors provided limited benefit in reducing the overhead needed to cover all SDCs.
Our approach consistently yields much better execution overheads for all SDC coverage targets
of interest on average. The optimal solution at 90%, 99%, and 100% average SDC coverage incur
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execution overhead of 12%, 19%, and 27% respectively, whereas the corresponding overheads for
the redundancy-only solution are 30%, 43%, and 51% (which are 2.5X, 2.26X, and 1.89X higher).
5.4 Summary
Relyzer enables finding virtually all SDC-causing error sites in an application and this chapter
exploits this capability to develop cost-effective SDC-targeted error detectors, as the first application
of Relyzer. To achieve this goal, this chapter first presents an understanding of the program-level
properties that repeatedly appear across different SDC-causing locations in the same application
and across different applications. This analysis facilitated the placement and development of low
cost program-level error detectors. For placement, the program locations were selected such that
many errors propagate to these points in a few variables. For detectors, a range of program-level
property checks were exploited such as checking for value equality between variables, range checks,
and checking similar computations. Our results show that these SDC-targeted detectors were able
to convert an average of 84% of the SDCs to detections across the studied applications, at an average
execution overhead of 10%.
This chapter also employs Relyzer and these SDC-targeted detectors to tune resiliency at low
cost, as the second application of Relyzer. Relyzer enables finding near-optimal cost error detectors
for any SDC reduction target, allowing us to obtain continuous SDC coverage vs. performance
trade-off curves. Using the developed low cost program-level detectors and selective instruction-level
duplication based detectors for instructions that are not covered by program-level detectors, this
chapter presents SDC coverage vs. execution overhead trade-off curves for our application. Results
show that the developed program-level detectors (with instruction-level redundancy as backup) show
significantly lower execution overheads on average when compared to instruction-level redundancy
alone at all SDC coverage targets of interest; e.g., 19% vs. 43% for 99% SDC coverage, presenting
system architects with effective design choices.
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Chapter 6
Evaluating Pure Program Analyses
Based Metrics to Find SDCs
Relyzer makes it possible to list SDC-causing instructions with high accuracy. It requires detailed
dynamic profiles of the applications (majority of them are input specific). These input-specific
profiles may be hard to obtain. Previous work has used simple (static and dynamic) program
properties to identify program locations that are susceptible to producing SDCs. These techniques
are much faster than Relyzer (and statistical fault injection based techniques), but their accuracy
could not be validated.
Relyzer, for the first time, enables determining the accuracy of previously proposed pure program
analyses based techniques (because it provides error outcomes for virtually all instructions). In this
chapter, we study the approach proposed by [41] (and some derivatives) as an example to evaluate
pure program analyses based techniques. Although our results were largely negative, we present
them for completeness. It is possible that other pure program analyses techniques provide better
results, but a comprehensive study is beyond the scope of this chapter. We believe our results here
provide evidence that such models are not straightforward to determine and signify the importance
of Relyzer. This effort was led by my colleague Radha Venkatagiri.
6.1 Pure program analyses based metrics for finding SDCs
Based on the results from [41], we explore the following two metrics for a given static instruction,
as an indicator of its vulnerability to SDCs: (1) Fanout is defined for a dynamic instruction that
writes to a register R as the number of uses of R before the next dynamic write to R. For a given
static instruction, the fanout metric describes the cumulative fanout of all the dynamic instances
of the instruction in the program. (2) Av.lifetime is defined for a static instruction that writes to
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a register as the average of the lifetimes of dynamic instances of the static instruction. Lifetime
for a dynamic instruction Id that writes to a register R is defined as the number of cycles from the
execution of Id to the last use of R before the next dynamic write to R.
Additionally, we also explore the following three metrics: (1) Av.fanout, which is the fanout
averaged over all dynamic instances of an instruction. (2) Lifetime, which is the cumulative lifetime
over all dynamic instances of an instruction. (3) Dyn.inst, which is the total number of instances
of the static instruction. The last metric was also explored in the prior work, but did not give good
results – we explore it here because it performed better than other metrics in some cases for our
results.
For a given static instruction, we also obtain the number of SDCs it produces by employing
Relyzer and use it as the golden metric (sdc). We evaluate our five metrics using five of our
applications (Blackscholes, Swaptions, FFT, LU, and Water). We collect the values of these metrics
at the instruction level using Simics. We normalize all our metric values to one. For our error
model, we consider transient errors or single bit flips in every bit in destination integer architecture
registers (one at a time) of executing instructions.
6.2 Evaluation methodology
To evaluate our metrics, we first quantify how accurately they predict SDCs in isolation using
two methods. First, for each application, we measure Correlation Coefficients1 between individual
metrics and sdc (golden metric).
Our second method of comparison observes that the objective of estimating SDCs with a metric is
to find the best instructions to place error detectors to convert the SDCs to detections. We therefore
first employ a 0/1 knapsack algorithm to find the optimal set of detectors that will provide the largest
SDC coverage at a given cost – we assume duplication for detectors and charge one instruction as
cost for duplicating and comparing results for one instruction on average. Thus, we determine SDC
reduction vs. cost graphs using the known SDC count for each instruction from Relyzer (the sdc
1Correlation Coefficients cc are a standard measure of the linear relationship between two variables X and Y giving
a value between +1 and -1 inclusive. |cc| gives the strength of the correlation (1 indicates a perfect linear correlation
and 0 indicates no correlation between X and Y). We use Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients for our analysis.
82
golden metric). We call this curve the Relyzer curve (RC), which is similar to the curves shown in
Figure 5.9 but with flipped axes.
We then apply the same knapsack algorithm using the metric of interest instead of the SDC
count and plot a curve that we call the Prediction curve (PC). This curve is the predicted SDC
reduction vs. cost curve if the metric were accurate. We also plot an Actual Curve (AC) as follows.
For each point on the PC curve, we calculate and plot the actual number of SDCs (from Relyzer)
covered by the instructions actually identified by the metric in the PC curve. This gives the actual
SDC reduction vs. cost of the metric. For a given cost, the gap between AC and RC tells us how
well the metric estimates SDCs (the smaller the gap, the better).
We also evaluate combinations of the above metrics using linear models based on regression
techniques that use these metrics to predict SDCs being produced by the instructions. We use the
statistical tool R to build (least square) linear regression models for each of the benchmarks, which
take the following form
sdci = β0lifetimei + β1fanouti + β2av.lifetimei + β3av.fanouti + β4dyn.insti + i (6.1)
We also attempt to evaluate a non-linear combination of our metrics. Since some non-linear
relationships between variables (or metrics) can be approximated using linear regression on poly-
nomials,2 we evaluated another linear regression to model the following:
sdci = β0lifetimei + β1(lifetimei)2 + β3(lifetimei)3+
β4fanouti + β5(fanouti)2 + β6(fanouti)3+
β7av.lifetimei + β8(av.lifetimei)2 + β9(av.lifetimei)3+
β10av.fanouti + β11(av.fanouti)2 + β12(av.fanouti)3+
β13dyn.insti + β14(dyn.insti)2 + β15(dyn.insti)3 + i
(6.2)
2The more complex the non-linearity, the higher the order of polynomials required.
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Applications vs lifetime fanout av.lifetime av.fanout dyn.inst
Blackscholes
sdc
0.25 0.56 -0.05 -0.04 0.62
Swaptions -0.03 0.23 -0.03 -0.02 0.27
FFT 0.08 0.49 -0.03 -0.01 0.80
LU 0.21 0.59 -0.02 -0.01 0.82
Water 0.02 0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0.18
All 0.13 0.44 -0.02 -0.01 0.54
Table 6.1: Correlation Matrix: Correlation coefficients between metrics and sdc for different work-
loads
6.3 Results for pure program analyses based metrics
6.3.1 Effectiveness of individual metric in predicting SDCs
We measure the Correlation Coefficients between sdc and individual metrics for all our metrics and
applications, as described in Section 6.1. Table 6.1 shows that for our studied workloads, av.lifetime
and av.fanout have no correlation with sdc. Lifetime displays weak to no correlation with sdc and
fanout exhibits moderate correlation for Blackscholes and LU. Although dyn.inst is the only metric
that shows high correlation with sdc for a few applications (FFT and LU), there is no single metric
that uniformly demonstrates a strong linear relationship with sdc for all our workloads.
SDC vs. cost curves
Here we compare the optimal SDC coverage vs. cost for instruction duplication curves using our
metrics vs. Relyzer by plotting the RC, PC, and AC curves as described in Section 6.1. For brevity,
we present the SDC vs. cost curves for a representative subset from our workload and metric
combinations in Figure 6.1 (the remaining graphs have patterns similar to one of the graphs shown
here).
For graphs that use av.lifetime and av.fanout, the PC curve immediately goes up to very close to
100%. This is because the static instructions that have very large values for av.lifetime and av.fanout
have few dynamic instruction. Hence, these static instructions they account for a large fraction of
these metrics and the execution overhead of protecting them (based on dynamic instruction count)
is very small.
Graphs for LU:dyn.inst, FFT:dyn.inst, and Blackscholes:fanout show a high correlation between
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PC and AC, which was expected based on Table 6.1 (correlation coefficients >0.5). However, there is
a significant gap in SDC coverage (in Y axis for a given value on X axis) between AC and RC curves.
For example, at dynamic instruction overhead of 20%, the loss in SDC coverage for LU:dyn.inst and
FFT:dyn.inst is 33% and 21%, respectively compared to Relyzer (RC). This is primarily because
the instructions that do not produce SDCs were also selected by the metrics for protection. To
understand this better, consider the FFT:dyn.inst graph from Figure 6.1, where the PC is a 45%
line because the dyn.inst metric predicts that all instructions produce SDCs proportional to their
dynamic instruction counts. The respective AC curve correlates well with the PC curve but the
detectors added for any x-axis point (execution overhead target) also protects instructions that do
not produce SDCs. On the other hand, RC places detectors for only those instructions that produce
SDCs providing a much more cost effective set of detectors for the same execution overhead target.
Overall, the large gaps we observed in the SDC coverage for a given overhead are unaccept-
able, revealing that the individual metrics are poor predictors of SDCs. This also indicates that
correlation coefficient alone is not a determining factor in predicting SDCs.
6.3.2 Linear Regression
Table 6.2 shows the result of the linear regression (using least squares) for our workloads (Equa-
tion 6.1 from Section 6.2). For each application we show the metrics that are significant in the model
in the second column. The adjusted R2 for the model is shown in the third column. Adjusted R2
value estimates the percentage of variance in sdc that is explained by the metrics. If the adjusted
R2 is high then the derived model is considered robust. For example, 0.68 adjusted R2 for LU
implies that only 68% of the variance in sdc can be explained by the metrics, which leaves 32% as
unexplained or caused by randomness. However, a low adjusted R2 value can be interpreted either
as the model is missing key additional explanatory variables (other metrics) that can improve the
model, or a linear model is not sufficient to explain the relationship between the metrics and sdc.
From our results in Table 6.2 we make the following observations:
• No common model (formed by a linear combination of our metrics) that offers a best fit for all
our workloads was identified. For different applications different metrics were identified as be-
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Figure 6.1: SDC reduction vs. execution overhead curves. The X axis for the above graphs plots %
execution overhead (in terms of increase in dynamic instructions) and the Y axis represents % SDC
covered
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Applications Significant Adjusted CV10 CV4 CV2
metrics R2 RMSE/Mean
Blackscholes
fanout,
av.fanout,
lifetime,
dyn.inst
0.58 [0.62] 1.62 [> 104] 62.65 [> 104] 203.3 [> 104]
Swaptions
dyn.inst,
lifetime,
fanout
0.08 [0.27] 4.39 [4.05] 4.49 [4.15] 4.60 [4.33]
FFT
dyn.inst,
lifetime,
av.lifetime
0.65 [0.66] 8.36 [> 107] 12.62 [> 107] 9.4 [> 107]
LU
dyn.inst,
fanout,
lifetime
0.68 [0.79] 4.64 [179.5] 4.42 [110.35] 4.58 [207.84]
Water
lifetime,
fanout,
av.lifetime,
av.fanout,
dyn.inst
0.04 [0.55] 6.62 [104] 6.31 [104] 13.22 [104]
All
dyn.inst,
lifetime,
fanout,
av.lifetime
0.30 [0.484] 4.93 [5.25] 4.77 [6.47] 4.83 [37.9]
Table 6.2: Linear regression summary. Numbers in brackets correspond to the respective numbers
for linear regression on polynomials.
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ing significant contributors. For metrics that prove to be significant for multiple applications,
the respective regression coefficients (βi) were different. For example, even though dyn.inst
is identified a significant metric for Swaptions, LU, and FFT, the regression coefficients (β4)
were 0.33, 1.29, and 0.96 respectively.
• The adjusted R2 varied between 0.08 (for Swaptions) to 0.68 (for LU), and were mostly low.
This implies that either our model is missing key additional metrics or a linear model is not
sufficient to explain the relationship between our metrics and sdc.
• Since we could not find a common linear model that can explain the SDCs in our applications,
we attempted to identify different linear model for different applications with limited number
of error injection experiments (without requiring full Relyzer results). Hence we performed
the cross validation experiments (shown in last three columns of Table 6.2). The Root Mean
Square Error (RMSE) ratios for K-fold cross validations (CVK) with K = 10, 4 and 2 is shown
in the last tree columns (the reported number is RMSE/Mean). A K fold Cross Validation
splits the population randomly into K parts. K-1 parts are used for training the model and
one part is used for testing. This is done K times till all the parts have been used for testing.
For models that have relatively high adjusted R2 value (e.g., for LU), the cross validation
showed high errors (values >1) in the predicted and observed SDCs. For example, for LU,
the average error for CV10 is 4.64 times the mean.
Hence, we conclude that simple linear models based on our metrics may not be uniformly
explanatory or predictive of SDC for our workloads.
We conducted another experiment to evaluate more complex non-linear models to predict SDCs.
Since some non-linear relationships can be approximated using linear regression on polynomials, we
performed linear regression to model Equation 6.2 (shown in Section 6.2). Our results, presented
in brackets in Table 6.2, show that a trend similar to that of linear regression (using Eq. 6.1) was
obtained for linear regression on polynomials. No common model for our studied workloads was
identified and the error from cross-validation was also high. The the adjusted R2 has improved for
all our workloads, which indicates that non-linear combination of metrics can perform better than
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a linear combination in predicting SDCs. However, for several applications the adjusted R2 value is
still poor, indicating that other metrics and/or different non-linear regression models are required.
6.4 Summary
This chapter employs pure program analyses based techniques to study application’s resiliency.
These techniques examine certain (static or dynamic) program properties to identify program loca-
tions that are susceptible to producing SDCs [16, 41]. These techniques are much faster than pure
error injection based techniques or Relyzer, but their accuracy has not been previously validated.
Relyzer, for the first time, enables determining the accuracy of such (previously proposed)
program analysis based metrics and some derivatives. Hence, we studied multiple metrics such
as cumulative and average fanout and lifetime and dynamic instruction count. We also studied
combinations of these metrics using linear models based on regression techniques. Results presented
in this chapter show that these metrics and their combinations are unable to adequately predict an
instruction’s vulnerability to producing SDCs. Since the objective of finding such metrics is to find
lowest cost detectors to reduce SDCs, we also compared the optimal SDC coverage vs. cost curves for
these metrics with Relyzer’s. However, results show that there are significant differences in the SDC
coverage for a given cost budget, indicating that the studied metrics are poor predictors of SDC-
causing instruction. Although it is possible that other (unexplored) pure analyses based techniques
may be more accurate, the results presented in this chapter demonstrate that pure program analyses
based techniques to identify SDC-causing program locations will be hard to develop, which further
motivates future work on improving Relyzer (and GangES).
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Chapter 7
Related Work
The traditional approach for reliability is to use coarse-grained system-level redundancy (e.g., repli-
cating an entire processor or a major portion of the pipeline) [9, 36, 7]. There has also been sub-
stantial microarchitecture-level work that exploits redundancy at a finer microarchitectural gran-
ularity [7, 12, 14, 18, 38, 48, 49, 54, 50]. These techniques incur significant overhead in area,
performance, power, and/or wear-out that is paid almost all the time. In contrast to the above,
we seek a reliability solution that incurs minimal overhead in the common case where there are no
errors, and potentially higher cost in the uncommon case when an error is detected.
Software anomaly based error detection techniques [15, 17, 42, 60, 45, 28, 53, 22] provide one
such low cost alternative. These mechanisms treat anomalous software behavior as symptoms of
hardware errors and detect them by placing very low cost anomaly monitors in hardware or software.
Researchers have shown that this approach is effective in detecting both permanent and transient
hardware errors with only a small fraction resulting in SDCs through statistical error injections on
microarchitecture-level models [28, 22]. Such techniques form the baseline for our work.
7.1 Resiliency evaluation
There has been much work in evaluating resiliency solutions [34, 28, 26, 44, 43, 39]. Much of this
work is evaluated using statistical error injection campaigns on architecture-, microarchitecture-, or
gate-level simulators or FPGA emulators running various benchmark applications. The hardware
and software locations are typically randomly selected to achieve some statistical confidence. This
approach does not provide any insight on the parts of the application that remain vulnerable to
SDCs (other than for the relatively few application sites where errors were actually injected).
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SymPLFIED [40] and Shoestring [16] share our high-level goal of finding errors that escape
detection and lead to SDCs. SymPLFIED uses a powerful symbolic execution method to abstract the
state of erroneous values in the program. It injects such a symbolic error at all possible application
sites (one at a time) and uses model checking with the abstract execution technique to explore
all possible paths with the symbolic error and determines the outcomes of such paths (masking,
detection, or SDC). The focus of SymPLFIED is to reduce the number of error values per application
site that need to be injected (hence the symbolic error). Our focus, so far, has been on reducing the
number of application sites where the error is injected (we restrict the values by simply restricting
our hardware error models since that is not the focus of our work). Combining SymPLFIED
with Relyzer is an interesting future direction. However, it is unclear whether the model checking
techniques used in SymPLFIED can scale to large applications; so far, it has been applied to only
a few small benchmarks (e.g., a Siemens benchmark).
Shoestring provides a pure static analysis that identifies static instructions where errors are
likely to be detected quickly enough; e.g., there is a short-enough path in the data-flow graph
from such an error to enough potentially anomaly generating instructions. The rest of the errors
are considered vulnerable and the important ones among these (currently, stores) are protected by
duplicating any instructions that produce data that feeds into them. Shoestring succeeds in its goal
of reducing the SDC rate by about 34% to 1.6% at 15.8% performance cost. Shoestring employs
only static analysis to identify vulnerable instructions. Our approach (Relyzer), on the contrary,
exploits information known only at execution time (e.g., store and load addresses) and applies a set
of dynamic analyses that can distinguish between different instances of a static instruction. Our
technique bins application error locations into equivalence classes and then performs accurate error
simulation of the representative error to identify the outcome. This allows Relyzer to account for
masking of an error, quantify a program’s SDC rate, and enumerate the dynamic conditions that
make code sections SDC prone. Shoestring’s static analysis cannot achieve any of these.
Benso et al. [8] proposed a solution that performs runtime analysis of the application variables to
obtain the criticality behavior of every variable. That work developed an analytical model to obtain
this criticality behavior considering three variables – lifetime of the application variable, number of
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reads to it, and whether it is a pointer or not. The work proposed that the contribution of each
of these variables is application independent and once the parameters of the model are set they
remain fixed for all other applications. This work was, however, evaluated using small applications
with few variables. Relyzer, on the other hand, captures the error propagation behavior from the
error-free execution of the application and uses it to categorize errors into different equivalence
classes. It relies on error injection experiments on the pilots (representatives of the equivalence
classes) to estimate the outcome of the population and we developed GangES to speed up the error
simulation time. In Chapter 6, we also evaluated several program metrics (lifetime, fanout, and
dynamic instruction count of instruction writing to registers) and their combinations in predicting
the SDC-causing program instructions. However, our findings were largely negative and we could
not find any single model that can uniformly predict SDCs for our workloads.
Sridharan et al. [56] quantify the reliability behavior of an application using a metric called
Program Vulnerability Factor (PVF). PVF is a microarchitecture-independent method to quantify
architectural error masking inherent to a program. PVF focuses on identifying only those errors
that are masked by the application. It does not attempt to distinguish errors that lead to SDCs
from the ones that result in detection, but this distinction becomes crucial with anomaly based
detection techniques in place. Hence, our work focuses on distinguishing SDCs from detections. It
is unclear whether PVF can make this distinction.
7.2 Detectors to reduce SDCs
SWIFT [50] is a fully compiler-based software solution that inserts redundant code to compute
duplicate versions of all register values, and validation code for checking the two versions. SWIFT
more than doubles the number of dynamic instructions, relying on underutilized hardware resources
for performance. CRAFT [51] later improved the performance of SWIFT through hardware sup-
port. PROFiT [52] improved upon both SWIFT and CRAFT by adding techniques to manage the
desired levels of performance and reliability. It uses the programs performance and reliability profile
(obtained by statistical error injections) to identify the code sections that need duplication to meet
the given performance and reliability constraints. Due to the lack of fine grained knowledge of the
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application’s reliability profile, it considered duplication only at the function granularity. Moreover,
their expensive (in time) evaluation strategy limited them to apply selective redundancy on just a
few applications. Shoestring [16], however, obtained a list of high-value (or SDC-prone) instructions
through a static analysis and applied SWIFT-like selective instruction-level redundancy to protect
these high-value instructions. In our work, we obtain a detailed reliability profile through Relyzer
and use selective redundancy only on the SDC causing instructions as our baseline.
Software-level invariant based error detection has been applied for error detection [17, 53, 42].
In particular, range-based likely program invariants (inserted at all stores) have been employed
for reducing SDCs produced by hard errors [53]. Results show a reduction in SDCs of up to 74%
for a microarchitecture-level permanent error model, but with an execution overhead of 14% on
SPARC machines. This technique suffers from false positives which are handled with diagnosis
related hardware. For a transient error model, our technique provides a better SDC coverage vs.
performance trade off through a more selective placement of a broader range of detectors. Combining
insights from these two studies for both error models is left to future work.
Pattabiraman et al. [41], developed metrics, namely fanout and lifetime, to identify what ap-
plication variable to protect and where to place detectors. The goal, however, was to prevent or
limit error propagation and avoid system crashes with minimum possible detector locations, not
particularly to reduce SDCs. Subsequently, they also proposed a technique to automatically derive
application-specific detectors to be placed at these locations [42]. This technique tries to dynam-
ically associate a property check for the identified variable from a set of pre-defined checks. The
properties they used are similar in some respects to a few of our observations. However, they do
not consider complex properties spanning across multiple variables like the loop based detectors
presented in this thesis (Chapter 5). Moreover, detectors in [42] produce false positives, whereas
our detectors never fire in error-free executions.
Motivated by this approach, we explored fanout, lifetime, and dynamic instruction count, their
derivatives and several combinations as metrics to identify SDC-causing instructions in Chapter 6.
However, our findings were largely negative and we could not identify any single model that can
explain the SDC-vulnerability of instructions for our workloads.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Directions
8.1 Summary and conclusions
With technology scaling, the hardware reliability problem is becoming increasingly challenging for
a wide class of systems, motivating low cost reliability solutions. Software anomaly based detection
techniques have emerged as low cost and effective solutions with low Silent Data Corruption (SDC)
rates. However, for some cases, the SDC rates are still non-negligible. Hence, techniques to identify
program locations that produce SDCs and convert them to detections at low cost are needed to
eliminate or significantly lower the user-visible SDC rate.
The first part of this thesis proposes Relyzer, a technique to systematically analyze all transient
error injection sites in an application. It employs a set of novel error pruning techniques that
dramatically reduce the number of errors (application sites) that require thorough error simulations.
Relyzer predicts the outcome of several errors, eliminating the need for thorough error injection
experiments for them. It then exploits the insight that several application error sites are impacted
in a similar way by certain hardware errors, and develops heuristics to identify such application-
level error equivalence. Relyzer employs a series of static and dynamic techniques to categorize
equivalence classes of errors, such that only one pilot error from an equivalence class needs to be
thoroughly studied through error injection experiment. Through these techniques, we show that
Relyzer prunes the set of errors by 99.78% across the twelve studied applications. With error
injections in the remaining error sites, Relyzer can identify all SDC causing instructions.
Relyzer presents a practical resiliency evaluation approach but it still requires significant run-
ning time. Most of this running time is spent in error injections. Hence, this thesis presents a
new error simulation framework called GangES to further improve the evaluation time of Relyzer.
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GangES bundles multiple error simulations and periodically compares states to identify similarities
between executions to allow early termination, saving significant evaluation time. Identifying when
to compare executions and what state to compare is challenging because instruction sequence can
be different between multiple error simulations and comparing entire system state can be expensive
in time, respectively. To overcome this challenge, we leverage the static structure of a program,
identify single-entry single-exit (SESE) regions, and use SESE region exit edges as comparison
points. This approach provides limited and effectively spaced comparison points. We compare a
small system state comprising of live processor registers and limited touched memory addresses at
these comparison points. Results show that majority of error simulations do not need full applica-
tion simulation and checking of the output to identify the outcome of the error injection. Overall,
we found that GangES replaced Relyzer’s error simulation time of approximately 12,600 hours for
eight of our workloads with 6,110 hours, providing a wall-clock time savings of 51.5%.
Relyzer has many applications and the second part of this thesis demonstrates three of them: (1)
analyzing SDC-causing program locations and adding error detectors to prevent SDCs, (2) tuning
application resiliency at low cost, allowing system architects to efficiently balance SDC reduction vs.
execution overhead, and (3) evaluating pure (static and dynamic) program analyses based metrics
(and a combination of them) that aim to identify SDC-causing program locations with significantly
less effort and runtime when compared to Relyzer.
Utilizing Relyzer, we identified virtually all SDC-causing application instructions and under-
stood program-level properties around a large fraction of these SDC-causing instructions. This
analysis facilitated the development of low cost program-level error detectors. We find that these
SDC-targeted detectors can convert an average of 84% of the SDCs to detections across our appli-
cations, at an average execution overhead of 10%.
Relyzer also enables tuning resiliency vs. performance by identifying virtually all SDC-causing
application locations. We considered instruction-level redundancy based detectors and our program-
level detectors to obtain SDC reduction vs. execution overhead trade-off curves. Results show that
our program-level detectors (with instruction-level redundancy as backup) achieve significantly lower
overheads when compared to redundancy alone at all SDC reduction targets, on average; e.g.,
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19% vs. 43% for 99% SDC coverage. This demonstrates our SDC-targeted application-centric
resiliency approach, enabled by Relyzer, allows us to provide practical and flexible choice points in
the performance vs. reliability trade-off curve.
We also evaluated (previously proposed) pure program analyses based metrics and some deriva-
tives that do not need error injections as a faster alternative to find SDC-causing program locations.
Our results were largely negative and we believe they provide evidence that such program analyses
based models are not straightforward to determine, signifying the importance of Relyzer.
8.2 Limitations and future directions
8.2.1 Enhancing the program-level detectors
The detectors developed in Chapter 5 lowered the SDC rate significantly. However, these detectors
can further be enhanced in the following ways:
• Expanding the set of applications: Evaluating these detectors on more applications can further
strengthen our confidence. Studying more applications can provide us the opportunity to
develop new (application-specific) detectors if the current set of detectors do not provide high
coverage. Ideally we would like to develop a set of detectors (both lossless and lossy with their
coverage statistics) for the software designers/architects to select from.
• Accounting for application-level error tolerance: It has been shown that a large class of appli-
cations are inherently error tolerant [30, 46]. Utilizing this observation and tailoring detectors’
placement would be interesting.
• Automatic development and placement of the detectors: Currently the process of identifying
and placing a detector for an SDC-prone code section is mostly manual. Developing tech-
niques (or compiler passes) for automatic identification and placement of these program-level
detectors can significantly lower the programmer’s effort.
• Providing feedback to programmers: Developing detectors for all SDC-prone sections may
require programmer’s feedback in some applications. Hence a framework that provides inputs
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to the programmer about the SDC-vulnerable code sections would be valuable. We envision
such a framework to provide effective means to develop and place application-specific detectors
with low-effort.
8.2.2 Lower-level error models
The goal is to develop a set of detectors that are independent of the error model. Hence, evaluating
the detectors presented in Chapter 5 on a microarchitecture-level error model (or other low-level
error models) would be interesting.
Moreover, Relyzer and GangES were developed for single-bit-flips (or soft-errors) in instruction-
level architectural registers. Extending them to microarchitecture- or gate-level error models (which
can potentially show up as multi-bit or multi-value errors at architecture-level) is interesting future
direction.
8.2.3 Developing profile-driven metrics to find SDC-causing application sites
Relyzer makes it possible to list SDC-causing instructions with high accuracy. It requires detailed
dynamic profiles of the applications (majority of them are input specific). These input-specific
profiles may be hard to obtain. To overcome this challenge, we studied and evaluated previously
proposed program metrics (and some derivatives) obtained from simple and pure program analyses
to identify SDC-vulnerable program locations [41, 8]. We also evaluated a combination of these
metrics using linear models based on regression techniques. From our investigation, we concluded
that either our models were missing key additional program metrics or our linear model is not
sufficient to explain the relationship between the metrics and sdc.
Exploring new metrics and more complex non-linear models to predict SDC-vulnerable program
locations is an interesting future direction. From our experiments we observed that instructions
that do not produce SDCs (but have high metric values) were among the reasons for inaccuracies.
It would also be interesting to evaluate a two-step approach that first models the probability of an
instruction producing SDCs using logistic regression and then builds a linear/non-linear model to
quantify the amount of SDC for those instructions.
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We observe that software/hardware correctness testing also has the same input-specificity issue.
Leveraging solutions deployed to those fields, e.g., unit testing, is interesting future direction. The
correctness testing techniques also have another issue of covering uncommon corner cases, which
may not be a major concern for Relyzer because the faction of the runtime spent in executing such
program sections is typically insignificant, lowering their impact on application’s reliability.
8.2.4 Methodical resiliency analysis
The modified program structure tree or PST, as described in Section 4.1.2, can be utilized to
analyze the resiliency of an application. Traversing this tree in a top-down fashion would allow one
to identify SDC hot spots in a program. Traversing it in the bottom-up fashion, on the other hand,
would help in identifying the program locations where low cost detectors can be placed (i.e., finding
program locations where potentially many errors can propagate to few variables). Moreover, most
of the detectors that we identified in Chapter 5 were placed at the end of SESE exits (end of loops
and function calls). Overall, this tree structure can provide an automated framework to identify
and place program level-detectors to reduce SDCs.
8.2.5 Exploiting program indexing schemes
GangES performs system state comparisons at program points that are identified using the program
structure tree or PST (Section 4.1.2) to show equivalence between multiple error simulations to allow
early terminations (and simulation-time savings). This (indexing) scheme has the three following
properties. (1) It provides program points where most executions eventually reach even if different
system events take place or different branch directions are exercised. (2) It provides limited number
of comparison points (which is the depth of PST, typically <14 [25]) to limit the runtime needed
for comparing states. (3) It provides program locations where errors are typically consolidated in a
few program variables (e.g., end of loops and function calls, which are also SESE exits, Section 5.1)
because temporary variables typically become dead at SESE exits, providing effective comparison
points.
This scheme, however, misses some opportunities to show equivalence between error simulations
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(Section 4.3, Figure 4.7). Prior research in the field of software reliability has studied program
and memory indexing schemes [63, 57] mainly for software bug diagnosis. The structural indexing
scheme [63] provides a mechanism to uniquely identify individual execution points so that the
correlation between points in one execution can be inferred and correspondence between execution
points across multiple executions can be established. This scheme would provide GangES more
comparison points. However, mechanisms to prune structurally similar points are needed to limit
the potentially large number of comparison points this scheme provides (to obtain the properties
(2) and (3) mentioned above).
A memory indexing scheme [57] aligns memory locations across different executions, as opposed
to [63] which aligns executions. Aligned memory locations across runs share the same index. Al-
though, GangES only looks for divergence in memory states and not for the specifics of the state
mismatch, a memory indexing scheme can be leveraged to analyze error propagation behavior from
lower level (microarchitecture or architecture) error models to application level. Such an indexing
scheme can also be exploited to develop accurate application level error models (as opposed to using
single-bit-flip model at application level [13]).
8.2.6 Error recovery and detection latency
An important piece of any resiliency scheme is error recovery. The existing SWAT system relies on
full system checkpointing schemes like SafetyNet [55] and ReVive [58] for recovery. Recently, it has
been shown that the I/O activity can limit the tolerable recovery window to 100K instructions as
the execution overheads increase significantly with larger checkpoint windows [46].
This dictates the guarantees that a detection scheme should provide for detection latency. In
our work, however, we did not evaluate the latency provided by our program-level detectors (from
Chapter 5). Hence, measuring these detection latencies and tailoring our detectors such that they
convert SDCs to detections within the recoverable window is important future work.
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